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I Went Down to the Crossroads: Lifting
the Blindfold About the Origin of
501(c)(4) Political Advertisements
By ANDREW C. BYRNES & CORTLIN H. LANNIN*
Introduction
ON JANUARY 21, 2010, the Supreme Court dropped a bomb on
American politics. Coinciding with a powerful backlash in corporate
boardrooms and among the conservative establishment against Presi-
dent Obama and the Democratic Party-controlled Congress, and bol-
stered by the media-beloved “tea party” movement, the Court’s
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission1 transformed
the American political landscape. The decision helped Republicans
retake both houses of Congress in the 2010 elections and signals a
change in the locus of electoral influence from parties and candi-
dates, whose donors are disclosed, toward third party organizations,
many with undisclosed contributors.2
The expenditure of large amounts of money to impact American
elections did not begin with Citizens United.3 Nonetheless, since the
* Mr. Byrnes is a partner, and Mr. Lannin is an associate of Covington & Burling,
LLP. This Article represents only their personal views and does not necessarily reflect the
views of Covington & Burling LLP, or any of its clients, attorneys and affiliates. Thanks to
Robert Lenhard and Kevin Shortill for their feedback and guidance, and to Jonathan
Chou for first-rate research assistance.
1. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. Id. at 940 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
ruling distorts BCRA’s regulatory scheme in favor of corporations/unions as opposed to
parties); R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41542, THE STATE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
POLICY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 13 (2010) (“Following Citizens
United and SpeechNow, it is also possible that tax-exempt organizations, corporations, or
unions will rival or overshadow the parties’ financial prowess in the long term.”).
3. See, e.g., Press Release, FEC, 2008 Presidential Campaign Financial Activity Sum-
marized: Receipts Nearly Double 2004 Total (June 8, 2009), available at http://www.fec.
gov/press/press2009/20090608PresStat.shtml. In 2008, total presidential campaign spend-
ing topped $1.8 billion. Id. The Obama for President campaign alone spent $729.3 million.
Press Release, FEC, Presidential Pre-Nomination Campaign Disbursements December 31,
481
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enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”)4 of
2002, election dollars came primarily from a large number of compar-
atively smaller donations to candidates and parties from individuals,5
Political Action Committees (“PACs”),6 and independent expendi-
tures typically funded by wealthy individuals.7 BCRA banned “soft
money” donations to parties,8 and the law long prohibited using cor-
porate and labor union treasury funds to campaign for or against a
candidate or pay for advertisements designed to impact a race close to
the election.9 These prohibitions provided a bulwark against both the
reality and the perception of a campaign finance free-for-all where
any person or organization, if creative or well-lawyered enough, could
spend unlimited funds to affect the outcome of a particular election.
Citizens United has changed that perception. The Supreme Court
empowered corporations, both for-profit and non-profit, to use unlim-
ited general treasury funds to make independent expenditures
(“IEs”)10 or electioneering communications (“ECs”)11 expressly for or
2008 (June 8, 2009), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/20090608Pres/3_
2008PresPrimaryCmpgnDis.pdf.
4. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified
in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.).
5. See Press Release, FEC, Presidential Campaign Receipts (June 8, 2009), available at
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/20090608Pres/1_OverviewPresFinActivity1996-2008.
pdf; Press Release, FEC, 2008 Presidential Campaign Financial Activity Summarized: Re-
ceipts Nearly Double 2004 Total (June 8, 2009), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/
press2009/20090608PresStat.shtml.
6. In 2008, individual contributions to federal candidates were limited to $2300 per
election (i.e., each of the primary and general elections), with a maximum $115,500 to all
federal candidates, parties, and committees. 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b) (2011); Price Index In-
creases for Expenditure and Contribution Limitations, 72 Fed. Reg. 5294 (Feb. 5, 2007).
Only U.S. citizens and permanent residents may contribute. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.20. Political
action committees may accept contributions of up to $5000. 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(d).
7. See, e.g., Chris Fitzsimon, Anti-Obama Ads with Tar Heel Ties, NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct.
15, 2008, at A11 (canvassing advocacy groups participating in 2008, including “Freedom’s
Watch, Alliance for a Better Tomorrow, Patriot Majority, Americans Majority, and dozens
more, all running ads across the country against a candidate they don’t like, usually with
money from a few wealthy individuals.”); Paul Kane, Liberal 527s Find Shortfall, ROLL CALL,
Sept. 25, 2006 (finding that the five largest individual contributors to “liberal” 527 groups
in 2004 gave more than $86 million, including George Soros’ contributions of $27
million).
8. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i (2006). “Soft money” refers to contributions that are not sub-
ject to the limitations and requirements of BCRA. Id.
9. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b, 434(f)(3).
10. 11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a). An “independent expenditure” is an expenditure for a
communication “expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candi-
date that is not made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or
suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, or their agents, or a politi-
cal party or its agents.” Id.
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against a candidate. Citizens United’s progeny have extended this right
to support IEs and ECs sponsored by another entity, such as a political
committee organized under section 527 of the tax code, a 501(c)(4)
social welfare organization, or a 501(c)(6) trade association.12 While
contributions and contributors to political committees must be timely
disclosed to the public,13 contributions to 501(c)(4) organizations
that are utilized for IEs or ECs are, for the most part, not being
disclosed.14
Emboldened by Citizens United, 2010 campaign spending by
outside groups increased more than 400% from the 2006 mid-term
election to nearly $300 million, roughly 60% of the combined spend-
ing of federal parties and outside groups—the first time ever that
outside spending eclipsed party spending.15 Groups maintaining the
anonymity of their contributors dominated the landscape.16 Two al-
lied organizations with ties to the highest levels of the Republican
Party—Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies (“Crossroads GPS”), a
501(c)(4) that does not disclose contributors, and American Cross-
roads, a 527 “super PAC” that must disclose its donors17—had a partic-
ularly profound impact on elections, especially in the Third and
Twentieth Congressional Districts in California. With the Presidency
and control of Congress in the balance, 501(c)(4) organizations on
both sides of the political aisle are already mobilizing and fundraising
11. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3). An “electioneering communication” is a broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication which refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; is
made within sixty days before a general election or thirty days before a primary; and, in the
case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or
Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate. Id.
12. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that limi-
tations on contributions to political committees did not apply to contributions to an IE-
only 527 committee).
13. 11 C.F.R. §§ 103.3, 104.1(a).
14. See Jim Rutenberg et al., Offering Donors Secrecy, and Going on Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2010, at A1.
15. 12 Months After: The Effects of Citizens United on Elections and the Integrity of the
Legislative Process, PUB. CITIZEN, 9 (Jan. 2011), http://www.citizen.org/documents/Citizens-
United-20110113.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN]; Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Deci-
sion Profoundly Affects Political Landscape, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.) (May
5, 2011, 11:16 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens-united-decision-
profoundly-affects-political-landscape.html.
16. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 15, at 9.
17. See Dan Eggen & T.W. Farnam, ‘Super PACs’ Alter Campaign, WASH. POST, Sept. 28,
2010, at A1. “Super PACs” are also known as “independent expenditure-only committees”
and are, therefore, not bound by the limits on contributions required of PACs that fund
candidates and parties. Id.
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from donors, who expect to remain anonymous, to impact the 2012
elections.18
Numerous proposals have been proffered to increase trans-
parency of contributions through disclosure, including fairly modest
contributions that could pay for only a small fraction of any IE or
EC.19 The proposal outlined in this Article balances (1) the need for
greater transparency of those attempting to have a major impact on
American elections; (2) the organizational burden and potential dis-
incentive for participation imposed by disclosure; and (3) the inter-
ests of contributors that have already contributed to these
organizations under the present disclosure regime. Specifically, we
call for disclosure of all contributors who make contributions totaling
$100,000 to any person or organization that makes an IE or EC by the
end of the day following the IE or expenditure for the EC. These dis-
closure obligations would begin on the first day of the next odd-num-
bered year following enactment.
This Article proceeds in several parts. We begin by discussing how
Citizens United upended decades of precedent restricting corporate
spending on elections. We then describe how regulatory changes have
limited disclosure requirements and galvanized anonymous political
spending even where Citizens United acknowledged the importance of
prompt disclosure. To ground these abstract principles in the
trenches where elections are actually decided, we then describe how
American Crossroads’ and Crossroads GPS’ involvement in two heavily
contested California congressional contests profoundly affected those
races. Finally, we conclude with a description of our proposal, which
balances the public’s interest in prompt disclosure against the politi-
cal reality that a bipartisan consensus around more fundamental
structural reform is unlikely.
I. The Supreme Court in Citizens United Invited Unlimited
Corporate Independent Expenditures to Impact
Elections
Citizens United was not the most likely case to end the prohibition
on corporate spending on elections. Citizens United, a 501(c)(4),
18. Brody Mullins, 2012 Election Spending Race Heats Up, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2011, at
A5; Alex Leary, Influence of Super PACS to Grow with 2012 Election, MIAMI HERALD (July 31,
2011), http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/07/31/2332319/influence-of-super-pacs-to-
grow.html.
19. See, e.g., DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3628, 111th Cong.
(2010).
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produced and released Hillary, a documentary critical of then-Senator
(and then-presumptive Democratic Party presidential nominee) Hil-
lary Clinton.20 Citizens United hoped to make the film available
through video-on-demand on cable television and to promote the
showings through cable and broadcast television advertisements.21
Citizens United brought a suit for declaratory and injunctive re-
lief that (1) BCRA’s prohibition on corporations using general trea-
sury funds for ECs in section 441b was unconstitutional as applied to
Hillary; and (2) BCRA’s disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting require-
ments in sections 201 and 311 were unconstitutional as applied both
to Hillary and the ads.22 Citizens United did not challenge these regu-
lations on their face, let alone the overall ban on corporate spending
on elections.23 After determining that Citizens United’s as applied
challenge did not adequately address their constitutional infirmities,
the Court struck down section 441b’s prohibition on corporate IEs
and ECs.24
A. The Fight over Regulation in the Electoral Marketplace of Ideas
Mirroring the battle lines over the propriety, constitutionality,
and impact of regulation in other contexts,25 the majority and dissent
parried over the role of regulation in the electoral marketplace of
ideas. Underpinning the Court’s ruling was the conviction that the
First Amendment could neither permit the government to prohibit
political speech by certain “disfavored” speakers, regardless of
whether the speakers were natural persons or organizations, nor at-
tempt to engineer or impact the range of participants in political
discussion.26
20. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 888.
23. See id. at 931–36 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24. Id. at 913 (majority opinion).
25. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (striking down Chicago’s
gun registration law); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct.
3138 (2010) (striking down Sarbanes-Oxley’s removal restrictions for members of the cor-
porate accounting oversight board and allowing the SEC to remove board members at
will); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (striking down the District of
Columbia’s gun regulations); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877 (2007) (striking down a prohibition on manufacturer-imposed minimum resale
prices).
26. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899 (“We find no basis for the proposition that, in the
context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored
speakers.”); id. (“The Government may not . . . deprive the public of the right and privilege
to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration.”).
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The Court directed its ire most pointedly at Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce,27 in which the Austin majority had relied on
Michigan’s interest in avoiding “the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of
the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the pub-
lic’s support for the corporation’s political ideas” to uphold a ban on
corporate IEs in that state.28 Framing Austin’s “anti-distortion” ratio-
nale as an inexplicable “aberration” from precedent,29 the Court over-
ruled Austin, skirting around the possibility that corporate
participation might in fact distort the political conversation as the Aus-
tin court feared.30
By contrast, the dissent echoed Austin’s concern that regulation
could facilitate, rather than impede, the marketplace of ideas and en-
able the listener to exercise her First Amendment rights.31 University
of Baltimore Law School Professor Christopher Peters has endorsed
this idea, criticizing as “stunningly anachronistic” the majority’s insis-
tence that a free marketplace of ideas mandates unfettered corporate
participation.32
B. The Exaltation of Corporate Political Speech
The Citizens United Court not only ruled that corporations could
“speak” by making IEs for the first time in sixty-three years,33 it called
upon corporations to do so. As the Court recognized, there are un-
doubtedly certain political issues regarding corporations (or, more ac-
curately, those who run or are affiliated with the corporations) that
may have unique insights or views.34
27. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
28. Id. at 660.
29. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (“[T]he Austin Court identified a new governmen-
tal interest in limiting political speech: an antidistortion interest.”); id. at 907.
30. Id. at 913.
31. Id. at 976 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Christopher J. Peters, Misusing ‘Marketplace of Ideas,’ NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 22, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202443880161&slreturn=1.
33. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (citing Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 313, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (prohibiting corporate IEs for the first
time)); see also id. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (banning corporate contribu-
tions to candidates)).
34. See id. at 906–07 (majority opinion) (stating that section 441b “permits the Gov-
ernment to ban the political speech of millions of associations of citizens[,] . . . [m]ost of
[which] are small corporations without large amounts of wealth”); id. at 907 (“The Govern-
ment has ‘muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most significant segments of the
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Going a step further, the Court’s aggressive condemnation of sec-
tion 441b and suggestion that its ruling released corporations from
the oppression the BCRA had wrought encouraged them to take ad-
vantage of this new freedom of speech.35 The Court’s use of such hy-
perbolic language, at least by effect if not by design, provided
political, as well as legal cover for the substantially increased corporate
participation in elections that has ensued.36
II. Prompt and Thorough Disclosure of Political
Contributors Is Essential for an Informed and
Empowered Electorate
The Court, long before Citizens United, has emphasized the impor-
tance of timely disclosure of contributions and contributors as a nec-
essary component of a transparent, robust electoral system. As the
number and influence of contributors to political organizations like
501(c)(4)s increases, disclosure is even more critical.
economy’ . . . [and has] ‘deprived [the electorate] of information, knowledge and opinion
vital to its function.’” (citations omitted)); id. (“By suppressing the speech of manifold
corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and
viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on which persons or entities are
hostile to their interests.”); id. at 912 (“On certain topics corporations may possess valuable
expertise, leaving them the best equipped to point our errors or fallacies in speech of all
sorts, including the speech of candidates and elected officials.”).
35. See id. at 897 (“The law before us is an outright ban [on speech], backed by crimi-
nal sanctions.”); id. (“These prohibitions are classic examples of censorship.”); id. at 898
(“Were the Court to uphold these restrictions, the Government could repress speech by
silencing certain voices at any of the various points in the speech process.”); id.
(“[P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or
inadvertence.”); id. at 907 (“The censorship we now confront is vast in its reach.”); id. at
908 (“When Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal law, to com-
mand where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she
may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This is unlawful. The First Amend-
ment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.”); see also id. at 942 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he majority invokes the specter of a ‘ban’ [on
corporate speech] on nearly every page of its opinion.”); id. at 944 n.39 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority for “suggest[ing] that the
FEC’s ‘business is to censor’”).
36. See Michael Crowley, The New GOP Money Stampede, TIME, Sept. 27, 2010, at 30. For
example, as Democracy 21 President Fred Wertheimer posited, because of Citizens United,
“a corporate CEO may see such spending as ‘an exercise of your First Amendment rights
rather than a potentially questionable circumvention of campaign-finance laws.’” Id. at 35.
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A. Disclosure of Contributors Who Make Possible Electoral
Activities Serves the Consistently Recognized Interest in
Knowing the Identity of Political Speakers
Having overruled Austin, the Court took a decidedly less contro-
versial path in considering Citizens United’s as applied challenge to
BCRA’s requirement that a person spending over $10,000 on ECs file
a disclosure statement with the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”)
identifying, inter alia, the names of certain contributors.37 The Court
found a substantial interest in the public’s knowing who is speaking—
and who is funding the speech.38
Specifically, the Court recognized the disclosure of the sponsor
and contributors to an EC (and IEs more generally) affords the fol-
lowing benefits:
• allows voters to “make informed decisions and give proper
weight to different speakers and messages[;]”39
• allows citizens and voters to “hold . . . elected officials accounta-
ble for their positions and supporters[,]”40 and to determine
whether they are “‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed inter-
ests[;]”41 and
• allows shareholders to hold corporations accountable for their
political positions.42
Knowing who is spending hundreds of thousands, if not millions,
of dollars to support or oppose a candidate will almost certainly pro-
vide insight into the interests to which a candidate is likely to serve.
Even if the candidate is unmoved by a deluge of dollars spent on her
behalf, those funding IEs and ECs would not do so without a high
level of confidence, supported by the candidates’ positions, that the
candidate is going to vote “the right way.”43
37. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)–(2) (2006) (mandating that unless the person or entity pay-
ing for the EC has set up a segregated fund, it must disclose contributions of $1000 or
more since January 1 of the prior year); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913–14.
38. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915 (“The disclaimers required by § 311 ‘provid[e] the
electorate with information,’ and ‘insure that the voters are fully informed’ about the per-
son or group who is speaking.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); see also Speech-
Now.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he public has an interest in
knowing who is speaking about a candidate and who is funding that speech, no matter
whether the contributions were made towards administrative expenses or independent
expenditures.”).
39. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 259 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 965–66 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129)); see McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 622–23 (D.D.C.
2003) (canvassing indicia of corporate influence in Washington and concluding “[t]he
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Central to the resistance to disclosure is the assertion that making
contributors and contributions public will discourage this type of po-
litical speech. There can be little doubt that certain individuals will
donate for IEs or ECs only if they can do so anonymously.44 Similarly,
corporations, which cannot give to candidates and therefore will not
be subject to the liberal disclosure regime for candidate contribu-
tions, may be deterred by disclosure. The Court acknowledged as
much.45
The fact that disclosure may discourage certain contributions
and, therefore, some political speech must be weighed against the in-
terest of an informed electorate in knowing who is speaking—and
who is paying for that person’s speech. Accordingly, the Court found
that BCRA’s EC disclosure regime was permissible as “a less restrictive
alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech.”46 Indeed,
the Court has consistently upheld requirements that political contrib-
utors and contributions be publicly disclosed.47
Citizens United and its allied amici also raised the specter of retal-
iation, even violence, against contributors whose identities are made
public.48 The realization that someone, whether an individual or cor-
record powerfully demonstrates that electioneering communications paid for with the gen-
eral treasury funds of labor unions and corporations endears those entities to elected offi-
cials in a way that could be perceived by the public as corrupting”); id. at 623–24
(reporting on poll showing that 80% of American public believes those engaged in ECs
received special consideration from the elected officials they had supported).
44. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (noting Citizens United’s argument to this
effect and citing amicus curiae briefs of the Institute for Justice and the Alliance Defense
Fund); see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (“[C]ompelled disclosure has the
potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First Amendment rights.”); DICK M.
CARPENTER II, INST. FOR JUSTICE, Disclosure Costs: Unintended Consequences of Campaign
Finance Reform (2007), available at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/
DisclosureCosts.pdf.
45. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (“Disclaimer and disclosure requirements may
burden the ability to speak, but they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities,’
and ‘do not prevent anyone from speaking.’” (citations omitted)).
46. Id. at 915 (citing, inter alia, FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 262
(1986); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 75–76; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 321 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
47. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 230–31; Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479
U.S. at 262; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 75–76.
48. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916; see, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States of America in Support of Appellant at 13 n.8, Citizens United v.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/
preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/08-205_AppellantAmCuUSCoC.pdf (“The use of donor infor-
mation for retaliation purposes is part of the daily news.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Center
for Competitive Politics in Support of Appellant at 9–15, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010) (No. 08-205), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/
pdfs/07-08/08-205_AppellantAmCuCtrforCompetitivePolitics.pdf; Crowley, supra note 36,
at 35 (noting contention that non-disclosure is necessary to protect contributors who “are
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poration, has made a political contribution may indeed prompt
speech or actions in response. Consumer-facing companies, in partic-
ular, risk alienating customers by taking a position on a major candi-
date who, almost by definition, has legions of supporters and
opponents. For example, Target Corporation was subjected to pro-
tests and a boycott threat after contributing to a pro-business Minne-
sota political group linked to an anti-gay 2010 gubernatorial
candidate.49
The Citizens United Court properly rejected these retaliation con-
cerns in light of the information interest in disclosure. While acknowl-
edging amici’s examples of retaliation that had occurred as a result of
disclosure, Citizens United had identified “no instance of harassment
or retaliation” in its long history.50 Borrowing the logic of the Citizens
United Court, if it is not the government’s job to influence the electo-
ral marketplace of ideas, it is certainly not the government’s job to
protect a speaker preemptively from the consequences of that speech
where the response is itself First Amendment-protected activities.
B. Only Prompt Disclosure Provides Voters Adequate Information
To make fully informed decisions, the voting public must know
the identity of the contributors prior to the election and shortly after
the IE or EC is made. Of course, voters cannot be aided in evaluating
the candidates prior to voting if disclosure of contributions does not
occur until after the election.51 Further, the increased prevalence of
voting by mail in many jurisdictions has extended the voting period to
encompass one month before election day.52 Therefore, certain voters
concerned about intimidation.”); Bradley A. Smith, In Defense of Political Anonymity, CITY J.,
Winter 2010, at 74, available at http://www.city-journal.org/2010/20_1_political-anonym-
ity.html.
49. Brody Mullins & Ann Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to Political Contribu-
tions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2010, at A2.
50. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
51. See id. at 915 (“[T]he public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a
candidate shortly before an election.”); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 200 (“Given the relatively
short timeframes in which electioneering communications are made, the interest in assur-
ing that disclosures are made promptly and in time to provide relevant information to
voters is unquestionably significant.”).
52. Cathy Locke, California’s County Election Officials Send Out Ballots by Mail, SACRA-
MENTO BEE, Oct. 5, 2010, at B1. Ballots are automatically sent to “permanent” vote by mail
(“PVBM”) voters, typically as early as one month before election day. Id. In the 2010 gen-
eral election in California, for example, 48.44% of voters voted by mail. CAL. SEC’Y OF
STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 2, 2010 GENERAL ELECTION 3 (2010), available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010-general/complete-sov.pdf [hereinafter STATE-
MENT OF VOTE 2010]. As of the 2010 general election, over 37.5% of California voters are
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will likely be voting on the day of or shortly after an EC is broadcast,
and only immediate disclosure can have any impact on their vote.
Similarly, attention to the disclosure of a contribution and its abil-
ity to impact the political process, even on a prospective basis, will be
substantially less if disclosure is made post-election. Not only does
campaign coverage rapidly wane after a winner has been declared, the
media and the electorate have demonstrated little appetite for a con-
tinuing discussion of campaign tactics and potential irregularities
even where the outcome of the election could be in doubt.53 This
desire to “move on,” enthusiastically encouraged by the campaign
leading in the preliminary vote count, means that indicia of poten-
tially corrupting contributions are unlikely to receive much attention.
The most effective disclosure will occur almost immediately after
the IE or EC is made so that a voter can incorporate the identity of the
contributor(s) in her evaluation of the advertisement and the candi-
dates. The current requirement that ECs and IEs made between
twenty days and twenty-four hours before an election must be dis-
closed to the FEC by the end of the day after the EC or IE is publicly
distributed serves this aim.54
C. Disclosure of the Sponsor of IEs and ECs May Cloak Rather
Than Illuminate Who Is Speaking
Even if the disclosure is timely, what (and who) is disclosed is
critical for voters to evaluate the IE or EC and the candidate it sup-
ports or opposes. In the present proliferation of organizations taking
advantage of Citizens United, the public and the media may not have
heard of the group or be familiar with its views until they see its first
advertisement. At best, only those who followed political news closely
throughout 2010 would likely have heard about even the largest orga-
nizations, such as the Crossroads organizations, before seeing their
ads. Moreover, the name of the organization is rarely informative.
Often, the name suggests concern about an important public issue on
registered as PVBM. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CAL. REGISTERED PERMANENT VOTE-BY-MAIL STA-
TISTICS (1992–2010), www.sos.ca.gov/elections/vote-by-mail/pvmb-voter-survey-1992-2010.
xls.
53. See, e.g., Donna Britt, Worst Voter Error Is Apathy Toward Irregularities, WASH. POST,
Nov. 12, 2004, at B1 (noting scant media coverage of alleged voting irregularities after the
2004 presidential election).
54. See also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (“With the advent of the Internet, prompt
disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information
needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and
supporters.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-2\SAN207.txt unknown Seq: 12 14-FEB-12 17:46
492 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
which the organization is unquestionably on the correct side, unwa-
vering patriotism, or both.55 Other names, like American Crossroads
and Crossroads GPS, which were formed in 2010, provide no insight
whatsoever into the organization’s origins or motivations.
Further, neither the identity of the sponsor of the IE or EC nor
the advertisement itself may be particularly informative of the inter-
ests and motivations of contributors. For example, a contributor desir-
ing increased domestic oil exploration might choose to target an oil
industry-hostile Congressmember by contributing to a 501(c)(4) run-
ning ads chastising her for her record on health care. Without disclo-
sure of the underlying contributors to the sponsor of an IE or EC, it is
too easy for a wealthy donor to obscure not only its identity, but also
its true goal, which may have far less public support than the issue
position taken in the IE or EC. Therefore, unless the underlying con-
tributors are mentioned in the ad’s disclaimer as required of the larg-
est contributors in some states and certain reform proposals,56 to
obtain useful information about who is behind the ad and not simply
the organization sponsoring the IE utilizing others’ money, the voters
must rely on disclosure to the FEC of the underlying contributors.
III. Current Federal Law Permits Contributors to 501(c)(4)s
to Evade Disclosure
Much of the response to Citizens United has focused on its empow-
ering for-profit corporations to make IEs.57 Citizens United itself, how-
ever, is a 501(c)(4) corporation (albeit a large one with for-profit
corporate donors, among others).58 The Court’s analysis concerning
the importance of disclosure did not distinguish among types of cor-
55. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 128 (“Because FECA’s disclosure requirements did not
apply to so-called issue ads, sponsors of such ads often used misleading names to conceal
their identity. ‘Citizens for Better Medicare,’ for instance, was not a grassroots organization
of citizens, as its name might suggest, but was instead a platform for an association of drug
manufacturers. And ‘Republicans for Clean Air,’ which ran ads in the 2000 Republican
Presidential primary, was actually an organization consisting of just two individuals—broth-
ers who together spent $25 million on ads supporting their favored candidate.”).
56. See, e.g., DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. § 214(b)(2) (2010); CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 2, § 18450.4 (2011).
57. See, e.g., Editorial, Corporations, Wealthy Dominating Politics, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Nov. 3, 2010 (“Following the Supreme Court’s radical decision in the Citizens United
case, corporations now have the same rights to make political donations as individuals,
drowning the voices of those who don’t earn billions or employ armies of lobbyists. And
anyone who thinks campaign spending only influences elections is delusional; it’s directly
related to what laws are made or blocked.”).
58. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886–87.
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porations. Since the government has a interest in the public knowing
who is speaking politically, it should not matter whether the corpora-
tion is a 501(c)(4). Nonetheless, amidst a complex array of relevant
tax and election regulations, 501(c)(4)s sponsoring IEs and ECs have
routinely avoided disclosing contributions and contributors.
A. 501(c)(4)s Are Social Welfare Organizations Whose Primary
Purpose Cannot Be Electoral Politics
Section 501(c)(4) organizations, which include both “social wel-
fare” organizations and local associations of employees, must be “pri-
marily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and
general welfare of the people of the community.”59 Promoting social
welfare does not include participation in political campaigns on be-
half of or in opposition to any candidate.60 Accordingly, while one
must review all of the “facts and circumstances” to determine whether
an organization is “primarily” engaged in promoting social welfare,61
the consensus among practitioners is that a 501(c)(4) may not spend
a majority of its time or money on electoral politics.62
B. Federal Regulations Require Public Disclosure of Contributions
to 501(c)(4)s for IEs or ECs Only in Rare and Easily
Circumvented Circumstances
Section 501(c)(4) organizations must report to the IRS all of
their political activities, which are publicly disclosed.63 They must also
report donors who contribute $5000 or more during a year.64 Infor-
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(1)–(2), (b) (as amended in 1990).
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii).
61. Raymond Chick & Amy Henchey, Political Organizations and IRC 501(c)(4), INTER-
NAL REVENUE SERV. (1995), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicm95.pdf.
62. See ERIKA K. LUNDER & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40183,
501(C)(4) ORGANIZATIONS AND CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY: ANALYSIS UNDER TAX AND CAMPAIGN FI-
NANCE LAWS 2–3 (2010) (noting that to maintain a 501(c)(4)’s tax-exempt status, (1) cam-
paign activity—along with any other activities that do not further an exempt purpose—
cannot be the organization’s primary activity; and (2) the organization must primarily ben-
efit public interests). In the wake of increasing 501(c)(4) activity in the 2010 elections,
there have been numerous requests to the IRS to investigate organizations that have en-
gaged in highly visible political activity. See, e.g., Letter from Max Baucus, U.S. Senator, to
Hon. Douglas H. Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. (Sept. 28, 2010) [hereinafter
Letter from Baucus to Shulman], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/53692379/Sen-
Max-Baucus-Letter-to-IRS-regarding-abuses-of-tax-exempt-status.
63. I.R.C. § 6033 (2006) (disclosed on Schedule C to Form 990).
64. Id. (disclosed on Schedule B to Form 990). In addition, contributions to
501(c)(4)s are subject to the gift tax although, until recently, the IRS did very little to
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mation identifying these donors, however, is not subject to public dis-
closure under tax law.65
The FEC’s regime underlying IEs and ECs requires disclosure if
there is a nexus between the contribution and a particular advertise-
ment or expenditure. This is an easily-evaded nexus that essentially
permits organizations that do not need to publicly disclose contribu-
tors as a matter of tax law to withhold identifying information under
federal election law as well.




Independent disclose “each person who disclose “each person who
Expenditures made a contribution in excess made a contribution in excess
of $200 to the person filing of $200 to the person filing
such statement which was such report, which contribu-
made for the purpose of furthering tion was made for the purpose of
an independent expenditure.”66 furthering the reported indepen-
dent expenditure.”67
Electioneering disclose “the names and add- disclose “the name and
Communications resses of all contributors who address of each person who
contributed an aggregate made a donation aggregating
amount of $1,000 or more to $1,000 or more to the corpora-
the person making the dis- tion or labor organization,
bursement during the period aggregating since the first day
beginning on the first day of of the preceding calendar
the preceding calendar year year, which was made for the
and ending on the disclosure purpose of furthering election-
date.”68 eering communications.”69
With regard to ECs, there is both a distinction between the stat-
ute and the regulation and between the regulation and the FEC’s pre-
vailing interpretation of it. Unlike 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(2)(C)
concerning IEs, the statutory language of 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(F) con-
collect the tax or seek penalties for non-payment. See Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Sets Sights on
Donors’ Gifts That Push Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A1.
65. I.R.C. § 6104(b), (d)(3)(A).
66. 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(2)(C) (2006) (emphasis added).
67. 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(1)(vi) (2011) (emphasis added).
68. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(F). Where funds are received into and paid out of a segre-
gated bank account, the statement need only disclose contributors who contributed $1000
or more to that account during the period beginning on the first day of the preceding
calendar year and ending on the disclosure date. Id. § 434(f)(2)(E).
69. 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (emphasis added).
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cerning ECs does not require any inquiry into the purpose of the con-
tribution and requires disclosure of “all contributors.”70
The regulations concerning ECs were revised in late 2007 follow-
ing Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life.71 The Court’s
ruling permitted corporations to use general treasury funds to finance
ECs that were not the functional equivalent of express advocacy and
only required disclosure of contributions “made for the purpose of
furthering electioneering communications.”72 These general treasury
funds include “funds received in response to solicitations specifically
requesting funds to pay for ECs as well as funds specifically designated
for ECs by the donor.”73 The FEC explained its rationale for the revi-
sion by emphasizing that investors, customers, and donors to a corpo-
ration’s general treasury funds do not necessarily support its ECs and
that disclosure of all those providing $1000 or more to a corporation
would be costly and burdensome.74
Notably, although the FEC stated that the “for the purpose of
furthering standard” was drawn from the disclosure requirements for
IEs,75 its justification for the regulatory change never limited disclo-
sure to only a donation to further a specific reported EC, as provided
for in 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(1)(vi).76 Instead, in its explanation, the
FEC consistently referred to donations to pay for “ECs,” i.e., one or
more ECs generally but not necessarily a particular EC.77
Nonetheless, shortly before the 2010 election, three Republican
FEC commissioners imported the narrow IE disclosure standard in 11
C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(1)(vi) into the regulation governing ECs to dismiss
a complaint.78 The complaint concerned a 501(c)(4) that had run an
EC against a Democratic congressional candidate without disclosing
any contributions made to further that communication.79 The com-
missioners concluded that, because the complaint did not provide
facts tying alleged contributions to the precise advertisement at issue,
the FEC had no reason to find that the 501(c)(4) had violated its dis-
70. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(F).
71. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
72. Id. at 480–81; 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9).
73. Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,899, 72,911 (Dec 26, 2007) (to
be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 104, 114).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 72,911 n.22.
76. Id. at 72,910–12.
77. Id.
78. Freedom’s Watch, Inc., MUR 6002 at 5–7 (F.E.C. Aug. 13, 2010) (statement of
reasons), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocsMUR/10044274536.pdf.
79. Id. at 2.
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closure obligations.80 With little threat of the FEC’s marshaling the
four votes needed to go beyond the organization’s filings to investi-
gate and punish potential violators,81 few 501(c)(4) groups funding
ECs in the 2010 election disclosed their contributors.82
In the wake of Citizens United and subsequent regulatory changes,
many commentators predicted a material increase in non-party spend-
ing in the 2010 midterm election.83 As any voter who lived near a
hotly contested election witnessed, those predictions were fully borne
out.84 The 2010 election saw an unprecedented surge in outside
spending and a sea change in the types of groups through which cor-
porations, unions, and wealthy individuals chose to channel their
contributions.85
IV. Citizens United Led to Higher Outside Spending in 2010
By all accounts, the Citizens United decision precipitated a gusher
of election-related spending by outside groups. One study found that
spending by outside groups (excluding party committees) soared to
$294 million in 2010, more than a 400% increase from the approxi-
80. Id. at 6–7; see also PUB. CITIZEN, FADING DISCLOSURE: INCREASING NUMBER OF ELEC-
TIONEERING GROUPS KEEP DONORS’ IDENTITIES SECRET 5 (2010), available at http://www.
citizen.org/documents/Disclosure-report-final.pdf (“[T]he Republican bloc of FEC com-
missioners . . . announced a new, even higher bar for requiring disclosure: Not only must
funds be earmarked for electioneering communications; they must be earmarked for a
specific campaign ad.” (emphasis in original)); id. at 3 (“A growing number of groups now
claim that they are required to disclose their funders only when donations are specifically
earmarked for a campaign ad.”).
81. There are six FEC commissioners, of which there can be no more than three
Democrats and three Republicans, and a bipartisan group of four is required at every step
of the enforcement process, even to find a “reason to believe” that the Federal Election
Campaign Act has been violated. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 111.9 (2011). Re-
formers have called for hearings on what they allege is a concerted effort by the three
Republican members to stymie the FEC’s enforcement of the Act. Letter from Ams. for
Campaign Reform et al. to Barack Obama, U.S. President (Mar. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.democracy21.org/vertical/Sites/%7B3D66FAFE-2697-446F-BB39-85FBBBA57
812%7D/uploads/%7BCC360C8B-46D2-41AB-9EB4-96650403DF68%7D.pdf.
82. See 2010 Outside Spending, by Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.),
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&disp=O&type=E&
chrt=D (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). Of the thirty-three 501(c) groups that made ECs in
2010 (ranging from just over $5000 to almost $33 million), just twelve (36%) of them made
partial or full disclosures of their donors. Id. Of those 501(c) groups that made substantial
ECs of $100,000 or more, only three of twenty groups (15%) made at least partial disclo-
sures. Id.
83. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Campaign Spending Limit, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1.
84. See, e.g., Crowley, supra note 36.
85. See Rutenberg, supra note 14.
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mately $70 million spent in the last mid-term election of 2006.86 In-
deed, the total from 2010 nearly matched the $300 million spent by
outside groups during the presidential year of 2008.87 Just under half
(46%) of this outside spending was by groups that do not disclose
their contributors.88
As the table below shows, the vast majority of so-called super PAC
and 501(c) activity in 2010 involved conservative-oriented groups. Of
the ten outside groups (excluding political party committees) that
spent the most in 2010, eight of them generally support conservative
issues and candidates.
Table 2: Outside Groups With the Most Spending (2010)89
Approx.
Ideological Spend Discloses
Group Orientation ($M) Donors
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Conservative $31 No
American Crossroads Conservative $21.5 Yes
American Action Network Inc. Conservative $21 No
Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies Conservative $16.6 No
American Future Fund Conservative $9.6 No
Americans for Job Security Conservative $9 No
SEIU COPE Liberal $8.3 Yes
AFSCME Liberal $7.4 Yes90
60 Plus Association Conservative $7.1 No
NRA of America Political Victory Fund Conservative $6.7 Yes
These conservative groups, often advised by the same circle of
longtime party operatives and officials, comprised a “new kind of un-
official but totally coordinated national Republican campaign ma-
86. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 15, at 9.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 10.
89. Id. Public Citizen reported that it analyzed FEC filings to compile these statistics.
Id. Ideological orientation for each of the groups can be found at 2010 Outside Spending, by
Groups, supra note 82.
90. Federal regulations require AFSCME and other labor organizations with more
than $250,000 in annual receipts to file a LM-2 form with the Department of Labor each
year, in which the organization must disclose its itemized receipts and expenditures. U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM LM-2 LABOR ORGANIZATION ANNUAL REPORT 1
(2003), available at http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/Form%20LM-2%20
Instructions12-03-03.pdf. A searchable database of those reports is available at Organization
Query Page (Disclosure), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://kcerds.dol-esa.gov/query/getOrgQry.
do (last visited May 31, 2011).
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chine.”91 Press reports suggested the impetus for many of these
groups might have been the internal turmoil and weak fundraising at
the Republican National Committee.92 The law prohibits these organi-
zations from coordinating their expenditures with a candidate cam-
paign or party committee, but they could—and did—coordinate with
other like-minded organizations. American Crossroads reportedly co-
ordinated its efforts with a network of at least two dozen other inde-
pendent groups.93 Top officials from these groups regularly gathered
at Karl Rove’s home to discuss strategy and dubbed themselves the
“Weaver Terrace” group, after the Washington street on which Rove
lives.94 These allied groups coordinated both their political activities,
by divvying up which organization would invest in which races and
when, and also their fundraising outreach.95
Liberal-leaning groups notably lagged in developing a similar net-
work. While traditional sources of Democratic support, including or-
ganized labor, spent significant sums in 2010, these organizations and
groups were slower to adapt to the post-Citizens United landscape than
their conservative counterparts.96 Multiple explanations for this have
emerged. First, President Obama, famously critical of Citizens United,
had urged Democrats to avoid forming Crossroads-like groups.97 Sec-
ond, reports suggested some wealthy Democratic-leaning financiers,
feeling alienated by a perceived anti-Wall Street bias at the White
91. Crowley, supra note 36, at 31.
92. Jim Rutenberg, The Gloves Come Off Early for Midterm Elections: Rove Returns, with
Team, Planning G.O.P. Push, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2010, at A1.
93. Id.
94. Rutenberg, supra note 92. Some of the major conservative groups, including
American Crossroads and former Senator Norm Coleman’s American Action Network,
even share office space. Crowley, supra note 36, at 31.
95. Peter H. Stone, Campaign Cash: The Independent Fundraising Gold Rush Since ‘Citi-
zens United’ Ruling, CENTER PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.iwatchnews.org/
2010/10/04/2470/campaign-cash-independent-fundraising-gold-rush-citizens-united-
ruling.
96. See Alison Fitzgerald, Democratic Groups Pool Money Efforts to Take on Rove, Republi-
cans in 2012, BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-19/
democrat-groups-pool-money-efforts-to-take-on-rove-republicans.html. It is also worth not-
ing that the two liberal-leaning groups that made 2010’s “top ten” (SEIU and AFSCME) are
also two of the most politically active public sector unions, which may help explain Repub-
lican efforts in 2011 to eliminate collective bargaining and other rights of public employ-
ees and their unions. See Brody Mullins & John D. McKinnon, Campaign’s Big Spender, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 22, 2010, at A1. One labor strategist, noting that labor unions have pledged $30
million in 2011 alone to oppose those Republican efforts, observed that “[e]very dollar
[Republicans] force unions to spend protecting collective bargaining is a dollar that can’t
be spent on politics, representing workers, or organizing new workers.” Mullins, supra note
18 (second alteration in original).
97. Eggen & Farnam, supra note 17.
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House, sat out the midterm election to send a pointed message.98 Fi-
nally, with most indicators pointing to a nearly inevitable Republican
wave in 2010, some regular Democratic contributors were reluctant to
“throw good money after bad.”99
The substantial influx of money on the right gave the Republican
Party and conservative-oriented groups a great deal of flexibility to
choose which candidates to back financially. Republicans had the lux-
ury of directing resources to races that would have been marginal in
other years, either because the Republican candidate was weak or the
Democratic incumbent well established.100 Some press reports sug-
gested Republicans spent money in some districts they did not neces-
sarily expect to win—essentially bluffing to draw precious Democratic
money away from embattled incumbents that likely needed the rein-
forcement more.101
This Republican strategy was largely successful. Seventy-five
House seats changed partisanship in 2010, giving Republicans control
of that chamber, and spending by outside groups favored the winner
in sixty of those races.102 As a rougher measure of success, in early
September—before outside spending substantially increased—the in-
fluential (and well regarded) FiveThirtyEight blog predicted Republi-
cans had a one-in-three chance of winning at least fifty-four House
seats and a nearly one-in-four chance of winning at least sixty seats.103
Boosted by a wave of outside spending in the intervening weeks, the
Republicans handily beat those early odds, claiming sixty-three seats
in November. While it is impossible to determine if outside spending
was dispositive in any single race and a strong anti-incumbent mood
likely bolstered many Republican candidates regardless of outside
spending, the improbable breadth of the Republican wave speaks to
these groups’ influence in 2010.
98. See Crowley, supra note 36, at 35.
99. Id.
100. T.W. Farnam & Dan Eggen, Outside Spending Upsharply for Midterms, WASH. POST,
Oct. 4, 2010, at A1.
101. See David Weigel, Nobody Is Safe, SLATE (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/politics/2010/10/nobody_is_safe.html.
102. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 15, at 12.
103. See Nate Silver, G.O.P. Has 2-in-3 Chance of Taking House, Model Forecasts, N.Y. TIMES
FIVETHIRYEIGHT BLOG (Sept. 10, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/
2010/09/10/g-o-p-has-2-in-3-chance-of-taking-house-model-forecasts/. The FiveThirtyEight
prediction model incorporates data from a variety of sources, including public polling and
the predictions of expert election handicappers. Id.
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V. The Emergence of American Crossroads and Crossroads
GPS
In the 2010 election, American Crossroads and its sister organiza-
tion, Crossroads GPS, emerged as lightning rods for both supporters
and advocates of the Citizens United decision. Certainly the vast spend-
ing these two groups directed at targeted races played a role in their
stature, but the sterling Republican pedigree behind them also com-
manded notice. Below, we briefly examine the origin, structure, and
activity of each group.
A. American Crossroads
American Crossroads is a “super PAC” organized under section
527 of the Internal Revenue Code and must periodically disclose its
receipts and expenditures. The group was founded in March 2010
under the auspices of Karl Rove and Ed Gillespie.104 Rove was a senior
advisor to former President George W. Bush and Ed Gillespie was a
former chairman of the Republican National Committee (“RNC”)
and also an advisor to former President Bush.105 While Rove and Gil-
lespie remain “informal advisors,” the current president and CEO of
the group is Steven Law, the former General Counsel of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce.106 The organization describes its goals as
“rescuing our economy from the Obama agenda, restoring health to
our financial balance sheet and making America the strong, vigilant
world leader we once were and must always be.”107
American Crossroads purports to reflect a grassroots oriented ap-
proach to political mobilization. It credits itself with having given
Americans the “tools” in 2010—“information, facts, voter turnout sup-
port”—to “take ownership of their government, throw out tax-and-
spend incumbents in droves, break the Obama-Pelosi-Reid power mo-
nopoly, and move America in a positive conservative direction.”108 But
the group certainly leverages substantial resources to connect with its
target voters, including expenditures on television ads, direct mail,
104. Crowley, supra note 36, at 31; Stone, supra note 95.
105. Crowley, supra note 36, at 31; Stone, supra note 95. For a detailed narrative about
Rove’s involvement in the origin of both groups, see Joe Hagan, Goddangit, Baby, We’re
Making Good Time, N.Y. MAG., Mar. 7, 2011, available at http://nymag.com/news/politics/
karl-rove-2011-3/.
106. Crowley, supra note 36, at 31; Stone, supra note 95.
107. About—Who We Are, AMERICANCROSSROADS.COM, http://www.americancrossroads.
org/about/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
108. Id.
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and get-out-the-vote phone banking and mobilization efforts. Ameri-
can Crossroads spent approximately $21.5 million on independent ex-
penditures in 2010, second only to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (a
501(c)(6) group).109 Including Crossroads GPS’ spending, the Cross-
roads organizations together handily outspent the Chamber of Com-
merce.110 Compared solely against other section 527 super PACs,
American Crossroads accounted for nearly one-third of all super PAC
spending in 2010 and spent nearly three-quarters of what all liberal-
aligned super PACs spent, combined.111
A substantial amount of that spending was directed towards politi-
cal ads (over 30,000 ads total, according to one report) and direct
mail targeted to the most contested Senate races, and (to a lesser de-
gree) House races.112 According to the Center for Responsive Politics,
American Crossroads spent over $1 million—and sometimes much
more—to attack the Democratic candidate in the Colorado ($5.1 mil-
lion), Missouri ($2.3 million), Kentucky ($1.4 million), Nevada ($1.2
million), and Illinois ($1.1 million) Senate races, and to support Re-
publican Marco Rubio’s ($1.6 million) ultimately successful bid for
the Senate in Florida.113 While these represented the group’s most
significant expenditures, American Crossroads also directed resources
to over thirty other contested House and Senate races.114 In the
nineteen Senate races in which the organization made an expenditure
of $10,000 or more, its preferred candidate prevailed 63% of the time,
winning twelve races.115 American Crossroads made similarly substan-
tial expenditures in nineteen House races, in which its preferred can-
didate prevailed 53% of the time, winning ten races.116
109. GARRETT, supra note 2, at 13–14; PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 15, at 9.
110. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 15, at 9.
111. Michael Beckel, Led by Karl Rove-Linked Groups, ‘Super PACs’ and Nonprofits Signifi-
cantly Aid GOP in Election 2010, OPENSECRETS BLOG (Nov. 5, 2010, 2:50 PM), http://www.
opensecrets.org/news/2010/11/led-by-karl-rove-linked-groups-nonp.html.
112. Hagan, supra note 105.
113. American Crossroads Recipients, 2010, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.),
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/recips.php?cmte=C00487363&cycle=2010
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011). Florida’s was the only Senate contest in which American Cross-
roads spent over $1 million to support the Republican candidate (as opposed to attacking
the Democratic candidate)—but that race featured a unique three-way dynamic in that
former Republican Governor Charlie Crist was also running for the seat, albeit as an inde-
pendent. Id.; John Whitesides, Crist Leads 3-Way Senate Race in Florida, REUTERS (July 13,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/13/us-usa-election-florida-idUSTRE66C4
I320100713.
114. American Crossroads Recipients, 2010, supra note 113.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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Because American Crossroads is a section 527 organization, its
contributors are a matter of public record. Overall, one-third of Amer-
ican Crossroads’ contributions were from corporate sources in 2010—
contributions that were illegal prior to Citizens United.117 The chart be-
low shows the top ten contributors, many of whom were solicited by
Karl Rove.118 The chart also represents, according to the New York
Times, an “old coalition of millionaires and billionaires who sup-
ported Mr. Bush and have huge financial stakes in regulatory and tax
policy.”119 Four individuals from this coalition accounted for 44% of
American Crossroads’ contributions.120 Bob Perry is a Texas real es-
tate investor and was a major supporter of the Swift Boat Veterans for
Truth.121 The three other individuals in this elite circle also have
Texas roots: Harold Simmons, Trevor Ree-Jones, and Robert Rowling
live or work in Texas.122
American Crossroads has made little effort to downplay these sub-
stantial contributions. One operative close to Karl Rove has suggested
that the publicity around the large-dollar donations were meant to
incentivize other, presumably more publicity-adverse individuals, to
give large amounts anonymously to Crossroads GPS—a strategy that
“worked like a charm.”123
117. Beckel, supra note 111.
118. Rutenberg, supra note 92; Top Organizations Donating to American Crossroads, 2010,
OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.), http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespend-
ing/contrib.php?cmte=CO0487363&cycle=2010 (last visited May 30, 2011) [hereinafter
Top Organizations].
119. Rutenberg, supra note 92.
120. See Top Organizations, supra note 118 (listing the total contribution amounts of
Perry Homes (Bob Perry), TRT Holdings (Robert Rowling), Harold C. Simmons Family
Trust, and Chief Oil & Gas (Trevor Ree-Jones), which totaled $14 million); Donors to Ameri-
can Crossroads, 2010, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.), http://www.open-
secrets.org/outsidespending/contrib.php?cmte=CO0487363&type=A&cycle=2010 (last
visited Nov. 29, 2011) (listing the amounts that American Crossroads received from donors
in 2010, which totaled $31.9 million).
121. See Republican-Funded Group Attacks Kerry’s War Record, FACTCHECK.ORG (Aug. 6,
2004), http://www.factcheck.org/republican-funded_group_attacks_kerrys_war_record.
html. The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth was a 527 political group that rose to prominence
(and attracted a great deal of controversy) during the 2004 presidential campaign. The
group attacked Democratic candidate John Kerry’s service in the Vietnam War and ques-
tioned the legitimacy of the medals Kerry was later awarded. Id.
122. Stone, supra note 95.
123. Rutenberg, supra note 14.
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Table 3: Top 10 Contributions to American Crossroads
(2010)124
Rank Employer (Individual) Contribution
1 Perry Homes (Bob Perry) $7,000,000
2 TRT Holdings (Robert Rowling) $4,000,000
3 Public Storage, Inc. (Bradley Wayne Hughes) $3,250,750
4 Alliance Resources Partners $2,425,000
5 Harold C. Simmons Family Trust $2,000,000
6 Chief Oil & Gas (Trevor Ree-Jones) $1,000,000
6 Jerry Perenchio Living Trust $1,000,000
8 American Finance Group $400,000
9 Weaver Popcorn $330,000
10 Aragon Global Management $250,000
10 Citadel Investment Group $250,000
10 Cumberland Resources $250,000
10 First Virtual Group $250,000
B. Crossroads GPS
Crossroads GPS is organized as a section 501(c)(4) “social wel-
fare” organization. Like its sister organization, Crossroads GPS was
founded in 2010 and shares Steven Law as its president. Crossroads
GPS also purports to focus on grassroots mobilization and describes
itself as a “policy and grassroots advocacy organization that is commit-
ted to educating, equipping[,] and mobilizing millions of American
citizens” to effect political change.125 Because 501(c) groups cannot
have the “primary purpose” of influencing elections, but may engage
in issue and legislative advocacy, Law has explained that Crossroads
GPS is “focused over the longer term on advocating on ‘a suite of
issues that are likely to see some sort of legislative response.’”126
“American Crossroads’ efforts,” in contrast, “are geared towards re-
sults in this year’s elections.”127 In 2010 and 2011, some critics com-
plained that, notwithstanding Law’s protests, Crossroads GPS often
engaged in thinly veiled electioneering in violation of the Internal
124. Top Organizations, supra note 118.
125. About, CROSSROADSGPS.ORG, http://www.crossroadsgps.org/about/ (last visited
Nov. 29, 2011).
126. Michael Luo & Stephanie Strom, Donor Names Remain Secret as Rules Shift, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010, at A1.
127. Id.
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Revenue Code.128 However, to date neither the IRS nor FEC have
fined or otherwise sanctioned the group.
In 2010, Crossroads GPS made approximately $16 million in IEs
and $1.1 million in ECs.129 Most of the group’s top targets overlapped
with American Crossroads’ spending, with Crossroads GPS spending
heavily to oppose Democratic Senate candidates in Illinois ($4.5 mil-
lion), Washington ($3.6 million), Nevada ($2.3 million), and Ken-
128. See, e.g., Letter from Gerald Herbert, Exec. Dir., Campaign Legal Ctr., & Fred
Wertheimer, President, Democracy 21, to Hon. Douglas H. Shulman, Comm’r, Internal
Revenue Serv., & Lois Lerner, Dir. of the Exempt Orgs. Division, Internal Revenue Serv.
(Oct. 5, 2010), available at http://www.democracy21.org/vertical/Sites/%7B3D66FAFE-
2697-446F-BB39-85FBBBA57812%7D/uploads/%7B02CFCA78-5618-44A8-97F6-
056444A48BA1%7D.pdf. In October 2010, Democracy 21 sent a letter to the IRS, request-
ing an investigation of Crossroads GPS, alleging that the group was “operating in violation
of its tax status because it has a primary purpose of participating in political campaigns in
support of, or in opposition to, candidates for public office.” Id. The group’s founder later
complained that Crossroads GPS’ tax status “is a complete joke,” because “Karl Rove and
Gillespie did not create this organization to influence issues in America. The organization
was created to elect Republicans and defeat Democrats.” Crowley, supra note 36, at 35. In
December 2011, Democracy 21 raised these concerns again in another letter to the IRS,
this time complaining not just about Crossroads GPS but also several of its peer organiza-
tions. See Amanda Becker, Reform Groups Ask IRS to Investigate Crossroads GPS, ROLL CALL,
Dec. 14, 2011. Democratic Senator and Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus has also
asked the IRS to investigate the tax-exempt status of 501(c) organizations that may engage
in political advocacy. See Letter from Baucus to Shulman, supra note 62. It seems very un-
likely the IRS has opened a (confidential) investigation of Crossroads GPS’ tax status, how-
ever, given that, at least as of October 2011, the agency had not yet even approved the
group’s application to operate as a non-profit. (Crossroads GPS filed that application in
September 2010, and could lawfully operate as such pending IRS approval.) See T.W.
Farnam & Dan Eggen, Lenient IRS Rules May Help Groups Shield Campaign Donors’ Identities,
WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2011, at A21; Search for Charities, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/charities/
article/0,,id=96136,00.html (last updated Oct. 5, 2011) (a search of the IRS database using
the terms “Crossroads GPS,” “Crossroads,” or “Grassroots” does not return a result for
Crossroads GPS or Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies). In any event, the IRS’ “incen-
tive to police” political groups is reportedly small because of the marginal revenue-collec-
tion potential and the deviation such investigations represent from the agency’s core
competency. See Luo, supra note 126.
Similarly, the Public Citizen campaign finance organization has lodged a complaint
about Crossroads GPS with the FEC, alleging the group had violated the Federal Election
Campaign Act by raising and spending significant sums to influence the 2010 elections
without registering as a political committee. See Complaint, Pub. Citizen v. Crossroads
Grassroots Political Strategies, (F.E.C. Oct. 12, 2010), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/FEC-Complaint-AmericanxroadsGPS101310.pdf. The current status of the
FEC investigation, if any, is confidential. Citing to campaign finance experts, lawyers, and
federal officials, however, the New York Times has reported that neither the FEC nor the IRS
is likely to examine 501(c) organizations closely, as they fall into a “regulatory nether-
world.” See Luo, supra note 126.
129. GARRETT, supra note 2, at 14.
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tucky ($1.1 million).130 The organization made smaller expenditures
in thirteen additional races, most of which were for the House.131
Crossroads GPS amassed an even better record than its sister, as its
preferred candidate won in 65% of the races in which the organiza-
tion made expenditures.132
As a 501(c)(4) organization, at least half of Crossroads GPS’ con-
tributions must be used for non-political purposes.133 Therefore,
Crossroads GPS’ contributors who are focused on electoral politics are
paying what Politico has characterized as a “secrecy premium”—essen-
tially contributing twice the amount to “keep their names out of the
paper.”134 Law has argued that this type of non-disclosure is necessary
to protect contributors who “are concerned about intimidation.”135
Sporadic press reports have shed light on the sources of Cross-
road GPS’ funding. Citing GOP fundraising sources, for example,
NBC News reported in November 2010 that a “substantial portion of
Crossroads GPS’ money came from a small circle of extremely wealthy
Wall Street hedge fund and private equity moguls.”136 These contribu-
tors were reportedly motivated by these contributors’ “bitter” opposi-
tion to a Democratic proposal to “increase the tax rates on
compensation that hedge funds pay their partners.”137
VI. Crossroads’ Activities: Two Case Studies
In 2010, American Crossroads and Crossroads GPS emerged as
the most visible of a new breed of post-Citizens United super PAC and
501(c) organizations. Their unmatched financial resources allowed
both groups to spend broadly and deeply, targeting races to reinforce
vulnerable Republican incumbents and bolster untested Republican
130. Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies Recipients, 2010, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RE-
SPONSIVE POL.), http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/recips.php?cmte=C900117
19&cycle=2010 (last visited May 30, 2011).
131. Id.
132. See id. (showing that Crossroad GPS’ preferred candidate won in eleven of seven-
teen races).
133. See LUNDER & WHITAKER, supra note 62, at 2.
134. See Ben Smith, The Secrecy Premium, POLITICO (Oct. 5, 2010, 9:45 AM), http://www.
politico.com/blogs/bensmith/1010/The_secrecy_premium.html.
135. Crowley, supra note 36, at 35. Critics have rejected this claim, noting that “disclo-
sure has been a central part of campaign-finance law since Watergate, with few examples of
political harassment.” Id.
136. Michael Isikoff & Rich Gardella, Spending Blitz by Outside Groups Helped Secure Big
GOP Wins, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39995283/ns/
politics-decision_2010.
137. Id.
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challengers. Furthermore, given the anti-incumbent mood that year,
the landscape of potential races in which the organizations could play
was vast. The November results made clear that the Crossroads organi-
zations had at least some effect: Republican candidates won nine of the
twelve Senate races and fourteen of twenty-two House races where
American Crossroads and Crossroads GPS made expenditures.138 As
the New York Times explained, these groups were “widely credited with
helping the party to take control of the House and diminish the Dem-
ocrats’ edge in the Senate last fall.”139
But what these aggregate statistics and anecdotal press reports
cannot show is how the Crossroads money made a difference on the
ground—specifically, how the Democrats they targeted reacted to the
influx of outside money, and whether it made a difference if that
spending came from American Crossroads or from Crossroads GPS.
To answer these questions, we analyze two California congressional
races that were hotly contested in 2010. In California’s Third District,
American Crossroads made a substantial expenditure to help suppress
a well-funded, well-organized Democratic challenger to a vulnerable
Republican incumbent. In the Twentieth District, Crossroads GPS in-
vested resources to help lift a neophyte Republican challenger who
very nearly defeated a Democratic “heavyweight”—a challenger who,
in almost any other year, would have been written off well before La-
bor Day.
A. California’s Third Congressional District
American Crossroads made one of its first significant forays in the
2010 campaign for the House of Representatives in California’s Third
Congressional District, which featured a match-up between Democrat
Ami Bera and incumbent Republican Dan Lungren. California’s
Third District includes much of suburban (and Republican-leaning)
Sacramento, including Rancho Cordova and Elk Grove, and stretches
to the east through Amador and Alpine counties to the Nevada bor-
der.140 Neither major party dominates this district; in 2008, 38% of
registered voters were Democrat and 40% were Republican, and in
2010 that composition had changed marginally (37% Democrat and
138. Id.
139. Jim Rutenberg, Now, Liberals Offer Donors a Cash Cloak, N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 2011,
at A1.
140. See MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS,
2008, at 170 (Charles Mahtesian ed., 2008).
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41% Republican).141 Further reflecting the district’s moderate orien-
tation, President Obama and John McCain split this district in 2008
(winning 49% of the vote each), and Lungren garnered a relatively
small six point margin of victory over his Democratic challenger that
year (49.5% to 44%).142 Lungren’s six point victory in an otherwise
Democratic year suggests some consolidation of his seat, to which he
was first elected in 2004.
Lungren is a Georgetown-educated lawyer with a lengthy history
of holding elected office.143 First elected to Congress in 1978, repre-
senting California’s Thirty-Fourth District, Lungren held that position
for ten years before moving to state government.144 He served as Cali-
fornia Attorney General and then unsuccessfully challenged Gray Da-
vis for Governor in 1998.145 After a brief stint in private practice,
Lungren returned to Congress in 2004 and quickly landed on the
House Judiciary and Homeland Security Committees, among
others.146 His 2010 opponent, Ami Bera, is a physician who formerly
served as Chief Medical Officer for Sacramento County.147 Bera’s par-
ents emigrated to the United States from India in the 1950s before he
was born, and Bera considers himself “as part of a wave of new Indian-
American leaders,” which includes Governor Bobby Jindal of
Louisiana.148
As the 2010 campaign opened, Bera’s early fund-raising prowess
attracted the attention of the national Democratic Party, which
141. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, REPORT OF REGISTRATION AS OF OCTOBER 20, 2008, at 11,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/15day-presgen-08/congressional.pdf (last
visited May 30, 2011); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, REPORT OF REGISTRATION AS OF OCTOBER 18,
2010, at 15, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/15day-gen-10/congressional.
pdf (last visited May 30, 2011).
142. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008,
GENERAL ELECTION 31, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/ssov/ssov-com-
plete.pdf (last visited May 30, 2011) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF VOTE
2008]; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL ELECTION 23,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/sov_complete.pdf (last visited May 30,
2011) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF VOTE 2008].
143. See Congressman Dan Lungren: Biography, CONGRESSMAN DAN LUNGREN, http://lun-
gren.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=9&sectiontree=2,9 (last visited May 30, 2011).
144. Id.; BARONE & COHEN, supra note 140, at 170.
145. Congressman Dan Lungren: Biography, supra note 143; BARONE & COHEN, supra note
140, at 170–71.
146. Congressman Dan Lungren: Biography, supra note 143; BARONE & COHEN, supra note
140, at 171.
147. About Dr. Ami Bera, BERAFORCONGRESS.COM, http://www.beraforcongress.com/
pages/about/ (last visited May 30, 2011).
148. Jesse McKinley, 3 Districts Where G.O.P. May Be Losing Its Hold: Newcomer’s Money and
Ads Grab Attention in California, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2010, at A14.
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quickly identified this race as one of the very few pick-up opportuni-
ties in an otherwise bleak year. According to FEC reports, Bera out-
raised Lungren for much of 2009 and 2010 and, in July of 2010,
reported over $1 million cash-on-hand—outpacing Lungren’s total of
approximately $800,000.149 At least one early poll of likely voters
(commissioned by the liberal Daily Kos blog) reinforced Democrats’
optimism, showing Bera within single-digit striking distance of Lun-
gren, trailing by 39% to 46%.150
The major themes of the campaign were established early. Per-
haps sensing an anti-incumbent wave, the Bera campaign portrayed
Lungren as a career politician.151 Conversely, the Lungren campaign
suggested that Bera was former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s
candidate of choice, well-funded by Democratic donors, and the true
insider in the race.152 These themes crystallized as each candidate
launched his media campaign. In mid-September, Bera aired the first
television ad of the campaign, attacking Lungren as a “Washington
insider” who was “plagued by ethics issues” including alleged pension
“double dipping.”153 Bera later followed with a second ad mocking
Lungren for finding ethics loopholes to attend a lobbyist-funded
event in Hawaii.154 On October 11, Lungren launched his own media
campaign with an ad, appropriately titled “Pelosi,” which labeled Bera
as “basically a [Nancy] Pelosi clone” and suggested he favored a
“nanny state” government that told voters “what you can do when you
can do it.”155 In mid-October, Lungren launched a second, similar ad
149. Kasie Hunt, Bera Beats Lungren in Money Chase, POLITICO (July 20, 2010, 2:22 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/39963.html; Klein’s in an Old West Battle,
NAT’L J. HOUSE RACE HOTLINE, July 16, 2010. Lungren later suggested, and Bera acknowl-
edged, that at least some of that fundraising strength was attributable to support in the
Indian-American community. See Hunt, supra.
150. See Steve Singiser, CA-03: Lungren Weak, Leads Little Known Bera by Single Digits,
DAILY KOS (Sept. 22, 2010, 8:46 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/09/22/
903727/-CA-03:-Lungren-weak,-leads-little-known-Bera-by-single-digits.
151. Id.
152. See Drew Joseph, Lungren Facing Strong Challenge, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 14, 2010, at C1;
Lungren2010, Lungren for Congress TV Ad – Who is Ami Bera?, YOUTUBE (Oct. 17, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-vKvQ9BUvI [hereinafter Lungren2010, Who is Ami
Bera].
153. See Joseph, supra note 152; The Big Dipper?, NAT’L J. HOUSE RACE HOTLINE, Sept.
14, 2010; BeraForCongress, “More,” YOUTUBE (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=R3cLLWIeyiE.
154. For Shirts and Giggles, NAT’L J. HOUSE RACE HOTLINE, Oct. 5, 2010; BeraForCon-
gress, Shirts, YOUTUBE (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AtCTbnKvbmg.
155. A Giants Problem, NAT’L J. HOUSE RACE HOTLINE, Oct. 12, 2010; Lungren2010, Dan
Lungren for Congress TV Ad – Pelosi, YOUTUBE (Oct. 10, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ivI4_-RaVU.
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that claimed Bera was “Nancy Pelosi’s hand-picked candidate” and
“Nancy Pelosi’s choice for more spending and more taxes.”156 Lun-
gren’s emphasis on Pelosi was not lost on the Bera campaign, which
suggested that “Dan Lungren should move to San Francisco if he
wants to run against Nancy Pelosi.”157
It was at this pivotal moment, less than three weeks before Elec-
tion Day, that American Crossroads made its dramatic entry into the
race. Explaining that “Lungren has been the recipient for [sic] a lot of
negative advertising exposure, and our efforts seek to go in and level
the playing field a bit,” on October 14 the organization spent approxi-
mately $680,000 to begin airing a commercial attacking Bera.158 This
was the single largest expenditure American Crossroads made in a
House race in 2010 and the eighth largest expenditure it made alto-
gether.159 The American Crossroads buy dwarfed any other IE in this
race by at least a factor of ten.160 The ad, titled “Far,” tied Bera to
“ObamaCare,” which the ad asserted involved “$525 billion in job-kill-
ing taxes” that lead to higher premiums, cut $500 billion from Medi-
care, and reduce benefits for 1.5 million California seniors.161 The ad
nicely dovetailed with the overall “Pelosi’s choice” narrative the Lun-
gren campaign was asserting by tying Bera to another prominent
Democrat, while simultaneously putting Bera on the defensive about
health care, a subject area that had previously not been a focus of the
race and one that Bera might have used to his advantage given his
background. The American Crossroads ad seemingly neutralized that
opportunity.
156. Can You Bera Any More Taxes?, NAT’L J. HOUSE RACE HOTLINE, Oct. 19, 2010; Lun-
gren2010, Who is Ami Bera, supra note 152.
157. Torey Van Oot, Lungren Calls Bera a ‘Pelosi Clone’ in New Television Spot, SACRA-
MENTO BEE CAPITOLALERT BLOG (Oct. 11, 2010, 10:08 AM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/
capitolalertlatest/2010/10/lungren-releases-tv-ad.html.
158. Torey Van Oot, Karl Rove-Linked Group to Air TV Ads Helping Lungren in CD 3, SAC-
RAMENTO BEE CAPITOLALERT BLOG (Oct. 13, 2010, 1:47 PM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/
capitolalertlatest/2010/10/rove-linked-group-to-air-ads-t.html.
159. American Crossroads Recipients, 2010, supra note 113.
160. See California District 03 Race: 2010 Cycle Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG
(CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.), http://www.opensecrets.org/races/indexp.php?cycle=2010&id
=CA03 (last visited May 30, 2011).The second most sizable outside spend was attributed to
the American Society of Anesthesiologists, which spent $50,000 to air two radio ads back-
ing Bera. Id.; Torey Van Oot, Candy Makers, Anesthesiologists Drop Cash into CD 3 Race, SACRA-
MENTO BEE CAPITOLALERT BLOG (Oct. 22, 2010, 4:07 PM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitol
alertlatest/2010/10/jelly-belly-concerned-about-na.html.
161. AmericanCrossroads, “Far,” YOUTUBE (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=aq4XCE1DYDM.
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The Bera campaign reacted aggressively to these developments,
focusing on the group paying for the ad (and its contributors) as op-
posed to the substance of their attack. The campaign released four
different press releases between October 15 and October 20 that de-
cried the influence of “special interests” in the race.162 The first, is-
sued on October 15, claimed “Big Oil joined with Wall Street to
rescue” Lungren, “one of their staunchest allies.”163 The release char-
acterized American Crossroads as “funded and operated almost exclu-
sively by Wall Street special interests, corporate lobbyists, and Big Oil
executives—including a former Enron lobbyist, the owner of the fi-
nancial investment giant AIG, and the manager of one of the world’s
largest hedge funds.”164 A fact sheet released with the press release
purported to detail Lungren’s connections with American Cross-
roads.165 Subsequent releases and opinion pieces echoed these
themes, attacking Lungren for “refus[ing] to denounce the mislead-
ing ads being aired by Karl Rove and his shadowy front group, Ameri-
can Crossroads.”166
The Bera campaign’s initial pushback on American Crossroads’
expenditure focused almost entirely on the nature of the group and
the contributors behind it—attacks made possible by the organiza-
tion’s 527 status and obligation to disclose donors. However, by Octo-
ber 19, Bera was attempting to correct alleged substantive
misrepresentations in the ad and clarify his own position on the
health care legislation.167
Because public polling is not available for this period, the effects
of the American Crossroads investment are difficult to measure quan-
titatively. The ferocity of the Bera response might suggest the cam-
162. See Press Releases, BERAFORCONGRESS.COM, http://www.beraforcongress.com/
press_releases/ (last visited May 30, 2011).
163. Press Release, Dr. Ami Bera for Congress, What Karl Rove and Dan Lungren
Don’t Want You to Know (Oct. 15, 2010), available at http://www.beraforcongress.com/
press_releases/entry/what-karl-rove-and-dan-lungren-dont-want-you-to-know/.
164. Id.
165. The Facts: Dan Lungren and American Crossroads, BERAFORCONGRESS.COM, http://
www.beraforcongress.com/pages/the-facts-dan-lungren-and-american-crossroads (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2011).
166. Press Release, Dr. Ami Bera for Congress, Dan Lungren Stays Silent While Karl
Rove and His Shadowy Allies Mislead Voters (OCT. 18, 2010), available at http://www.ber-
aforcongress.com/press_releases/entry/dan-lungren-stays-silent-while-karl-rove-and-his-
shadowy-allies-mislead-vot/; see Ami Bera, Karl Rove and Dan Lungren, CALITICS (Oct. 21,
2010, 12:03 PM), http://www.calitics.com/diary/12729/karl-rove-and-dan-lungren.
167. See, e.g., Press Release, Dr. Ami Bera for Congress, The Facts About Karl Rove’s
Misleading Ad (Oct. 19, 2010), available at http://www.beraforcongress.com/press_re-
leases/entry/the-facts-about-karl-roves-misleading-ad/.
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paign was seeing some damage in its internal polling or (if there was
no such polling) at least suspected the ad was having an effect. At the
very least, the ad forced the campaign to spend valuable time discuss-
ing and attempting to discredit American Crossroads and its “Obama-
Care” attack, at a moment when the campaign probably would have
preferred to concentrate on Lungren and the career politician narra-
tive they had been driving.168 Indeed, the local press appeared to have
focused on American Crossroads and its entry into the race during
this period.169 Even where that news coverage had a negative tone, it
surely represented a distraction for the Bera campaign.170 But it could
also be that the sheer size of the Crossroads buy had unintended con-
sequences. Anecdotal reports suggest Crossroads’ activity in the race
may have legitimized Bera’s challenge to Lungren and catalyzed con-
tributions from Democratic donors who were otherwise sitting on the
sideline. This speculation aside, it is abundantly clear the Crossroads
ad succeeded in changing the narrative and dynamics of this race at a
crucial pre-election moment.
On Election Day, Lungren won 50.1% of the vote to Bera’s
43.2%, even though Bera had outspent Lungren by nearly three-to-
two (approximately $3 million for Bera to Lungren’s $2 million).171
Bera had even underperformed the 2008 Democratic challenger, Bill
Durston, who spent approximately $700,000 on his race and won 44%
of the vote.172 Of course, 2008 and 2010 featured fundamentally dif-
ferent political environments, and it is difficult to conclude that Bera
would not have performed at least marginally better but for the Re-
publican mood that year. But it also seems likely the American Cross-
roads investment—a single buy costing as much as Durston’s entire
2008 campaign—also depressed Bera’s result and helped save a Re-
publican seat under substantial threat.
168. See id.
169. See, e.g., Van Oot, supra note 158.
170. See Dan Morain, Lungren at Center of Campaign Cash Debate, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct.
21, 2010, at A17. Shortly after American Crossroads entered the race, for example, the
Sacramento Bee published a senior editor’s editorial, which noted that American Crossroads
had turned “its bilious attention” to the Bera-Lungren race and criticized the “Far” adver-
tisement as featuring “hideous photos of President Barack Obama, juxtaposed against a
sinister-looking Bera.” Id.
171. STATEMENT OF VOTE 2010, supra note 52, at 58; California District 03 Race: 2010
Cycle Total Raised and Spent, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.), http://www.
opensecrets.org/races/summary.php?cycle=2010&id=CA03 (last visited May 30, 2011).
172. STATEMENT OF VOTE 2008, supra note 142, at 44; California District 03 Race: 2008
Cycle Total Raised and Spent, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.), http://www.
opensecrets.org/races/summary.php?cycle=2008&id=CA03 (last visited May 30, 2011).
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American Crossroads may have the occasion to intervene a sec-
ond time in this district. In early 2011, Bera announced he would
again run for Congress in 2012, setting up a rematch in a year in
which the political environment may be more favorable for Demo-
crats.173 As in 2010, the candidate appears determined to begin this
new race from a position of strength, and he reported raising almost
$860,000 through the third quarter of 2011, outpacing Lungren.174
B. California’s Twentieth Congressional District
Crossroads GPS made a significant expenditure in California’s
Twentieth Congressional District to help bolster virtually unknown Re-
publican Andy Vidak in his challenge to incumbent Democrat Jim
Costa. The Twentieth District captures much of the Central Valley
along Interstate 5 and includes parts of Fresno to the east and a slice
of Bakersfield at its southern tip.175 The district is heavily agricultural.
The Twentieth District is, as one leading treatise puts it, “the most
Democratic Valley seat between Sacramento and Los Angeles,” and
over half (51%) of the voters here are registered Democrats; just
under a third (31%) are registered Republicans.176 Recent elections
speak to this Democratic advantage; former President George W.
Bush did relatively well with 49% of the vote here in 2004, but Presi-
dent Obama dominated with 60% of the vote in 2008.177
Democrat Jim Costa, one of the Central Valley’s “legislative heavy-
weights,” was first elected to Congress in 2004, narrowly defeating his
Republican opponent by a margin of 53% to 47% in a tough and neg-
ative campaign.178 Until 2010, however, 2004 was the last time Costa
173. Torey Van Oot, Democrat Ami Bera Plans 2012 Rematch Against Dan Lungren, SACRA-
MENTO BEE CAPITOLALERT BLOG (Mar. 16, 2011, 4:33 PM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/
capitolalertlatest/2011/03/ami-bera-plans-2012-rematch-with-dan-lungren.html.
174. Press Release, Dr. Ami Bera for Congress, Bera Announces Overwhelming Sup-
port in California’s New 7th Congressional District (Oct. 12, 2011), available at http://
www.beraforcongress.com/press_releases/entry/overwhelmingsupportin2011/.
175. See BARONE & COHEN, supra note 140, at 216.
176. Id.; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, REPORT OF REGISTRATION AS OF FEBRUARY 10, 2011, at 23,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/ror-odd-year-11/congressional.pdf (last
visited May 30, 2011).
177. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 2,
2004, GENERAL ELECTION 32, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2004_general/ssov/
pres_general_ssov_congressional.pdf (last visited May 30, 2011); SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATE-
MENT OF VOTE 2008, supra note 142, at 33.
178. BARONE & COHEN, supra note 140, at 216–17; John Ellis, Costa Battles for Political
Life, FRESNO BEE, Nov. 3, 2010, at A5. For example, in the closing days of the campaign,
Costa’s opponent ran an advertisement mentioning Costa’s arrest, in 1986, for soliciting a
prostitute, and an incident in 1994 where police found drug paraphernalia in his home. Id.
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had to fight for his seat; he ran unopposed in 2006 and won 74% of
the vote in 2008.179 Costa, who was born in Fresno and worked on his
family’s dairy farm, spent over twenty years in the California State As-
sembly before running for Congress.180 In the Assembly, he developed
a reputation as a moderate Democrat who strongly represented agri-
cultural interests—an issue background that served him well in the
House, where he serves on the Agriculture and Natural Resources
committees.181
Costa’s opponent, Andy Vidak, was a political neophyte who, like
Costa, was born and raised in the Central Valley.182 Vidak worked in
agriculture for many years before starting his own cherry farm in
1997.183 With no encouragement or solicitation from his party, Vidak
announced his challenge to Costa in 2009, promising to “‘fix the
mess’ that had been created by career politicians” in Washington and
support agriculture through “tax relief, regulation reform, and sound
environmental and water management planning.”184 But Vidak was
considered a “sacrificial lamb” to a “well-funded incumbent,” and his
quixotic quest attracted relatively little attention.185 Pundits consid-
ered Costa a shoo-in given his strong support from the district’s agri-
cultural community and the “built-in advantages of being an
incumbent in a district with a strong Democratic Party lean.”186
Vidak’s fundraising reflected the conventional wisdom about his slim
chances; by the second quarter of 2010 (ending in June), Vidak had
raised approximately $120,000 and had less than $50,000 cash-on-
hand.187 In the same period, Costa had raised twice that amount
($254,000) and had approximately $330,000 cash-on-hand.188
However, in late summer signs began to emerge that the national
anti-incumbent wave could bolster Vidak’s challenge. A mid-Septem-
ber poll of likely voters, conducted for a local television station, found
179. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 7, 2006, GENERAL ELECTION
34, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2006_general/complete_sov.pdf (last visited May
30, 2011); STATEMENT OF VOTE 2008, supra note 142, at 27.
180. See BARONE & COHEN, supra note 140, at 216–17.
181. Id.
182. See Andy Vidak for Congress: Biography, VIDAKFORCONGRESS.COM, http://www.vidak
forcongress.com/?pg=bio (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
183. Id.
184. Id.; John Ellis, Valley Congressional Dems Stay Hopeful, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 28, 2010.
185. Id.
186. Ellis, supra note 178.
187. Klein’s in an Old West Battle, supra note 149.
188. Id.
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Costa leading Vidak by just two points, 48% to 46%.189 Vidak’s fun-
draising in the third quarter (July to September) also increased con-
siderably, as the challenger reportedly raising $332,000 in the quarter,
nearly matching Costa’s $445,000.190 Vidak, who spent far less in the
quarter, now had a cash-on-hand advantage with $206,000 compared
to Costa’s $164,000.191 At the same time, surging Republicans in other
districts required less support, freeing up outside money for Vidak
and other long-shot candidates.192
With favorable poll numbers and stronger fundraising, outside
groups began to take significant interest in the Costa-Vidak race—a
race that had been “on nobody’s radar.”193 In mid-October, outside
groups decisively entered the race. One conservative 501(c)(4) group,
the Center for Individual Freedom (“CIF”), spent $314,000 in mid-
October to air a commercial attacking Costa.194 Just a few weeks later,
on October 26, Crossroads GPS spent approximately $340,000 to
launch an attack ad against Costa.195 (The fortuitous timing of the CIF
and Crossroad GPS ads, with no overlap between them, was probably
not a coincidence, given the close coordination between conservative-
leaning outside groups.) Crossroads GPS’ investment in the Costa-
Vidak race was surpassed by their spending in only one other House
race.196 The Crossroads GPS ad, entitled “Boondoggle,” echoed
themes from the CIF ad and accused Costa of supporting “Nancy
Pelosi and her failed agenda,” including reckless spending and a
“stimulus boondoggle filled with sweetheart deals and handouts to
special interests.”197 By attempting to nationalize the race and tie
189. Vidak Attack, NAT’L J. HOUSE RACE HOTLINE, Sept. 15, 2010.
190. On St. Cloud Nine, NAT’L J. HOUSE RACE HOTLINE, Oct. 18, 2010.
191. Id.
192. Ellis, supra note 178.
193. John Ellis, Outside Money Keeps Pouring into Costa-Vidak Congressional Battle,
FRESNOBEE.COM NEWS BLOG (Oct. 26, 2010, 9:40PM), http://fresnobeehive.com/news/
2010/10/outside_money_keeps_pouring_in.html.
194. John Ellis, Hopes Rise for Costa Rival, FRESNO BEE, October 23, 2010, at A1; T.W.
Farnam & Nathaniel Vaughn Kelso, Campaign Cash: California’s 20th Congressional District,
WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/campaign/2010/spend-
ing/CA-20.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2011). The CIF ad, entitled “Costa Debt,” attacked
Costa for voting to increase the national debt and tied him to Nancy Pelosi and President
Obama. See TheCFIF, CFIF “Costa Debt,” YOUTUBE (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=y2Jfv9Vy6M8.
195. Ellis, supra note 193.
196. See Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies Recipients, 2010, supra note 130. Crossroads
GPS spent $447,125 to oppose Democrat freshman John Boccieri’s ultimately failed cam-
paign to retain his seat in Ohio’s 16th District. Id.
197. CrossroadsGPSChannel, Jim Costa Boondoggle, YOUTUBE (Oct. 25, 2010), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQGshcp3dSM.
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Costa to a controversial national Democrat and Democratic policy ini-
tiative, the Crossroads GPS ad shared clear themes with American
Crossroads’ “Far” ad in California’s Third District. In a striking reflec-
tion of how quickly the dynamics of the race changed, immediately
after Crossroads GPS launched its ad, the FiveThirtyEight blog revised
its odds that Costa would win reelection from 94% to 55%.198
Unlike Bera’s campaign in the Third District, there is little evi-
dence the Costa campaign pushed back against Crossroads GPS’ late
entry into the race. However, as Crossroads GPS was airing its attacks
against Costa, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
was ramping up its own spending on ads attacking Vidak—spending
that ultimately totaled over $560,000.199 In fact, press coverage of the
Costa-Vidak race during these last days of October generally focused
on the flood of outside spending and not the content of any particular
ad or attack.200 As such, any number of explanations for Costa’s
muted response to the Crossroads GPS’ ad seem credible. It could
have been that the campaign determined the ad was not breaking
through, given the clutter on the airwaves and the press’s focus on the
mere fact of the ads and not their content. Alternatively, given the late
date, perhaps the Costa campaign had neither the time nor the re-
sources to effectively push back. Finally, the lack of information about
Crossroads GPS’ contributors deprived the Costa campaign of at least
one line of counterattack—a theme the Bera campaign, in contrast,
had quickly adopted after American Crossroads entered its race.
What is clear, however, is that the surge in outside spending
helped produce a remarkably tight result on election day. Initial re-
turns on election night suggested Vidak had won the race.201 It was
only after all the outstanding ballots were counted three weeks later,
that Costa was declared the winner.202 In the end, the incumbent
Costa barely edged out Vidak, winning 51.7% to 48.2%, representing
a margin of approximately 3000 votes. Vidak’s result was particularly
remarkable given that the candidate “ran a largely invisible campaign”
198. Ellis, supra note 193.
199. Jean Merl & Patrick McGreevy, Incumbents in State Locked in Tight Races, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2010, at A21; Farnam & Kelso, supra note 194; see, e.g., DCCC2010, Andy Vidak Is the
One Thing We Can Do Without, YOUTUBE (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=hbQPkbfXp-Y.
200. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, Vidak Raking in GOP Dough, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 30, 2010, at
A3.
201. Ellis, supra note 178.
202. Alex Isenstadt, Jim Costa Defeats Andy Vidak in California Race, POLITICO (Nov. 23,
2010, 5:42 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/45549.html.
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and never debated Costa.203 The New York Times later cited Vidak’s
campaign as one in which conservative-oriented groups, including
Crossroads GPS, unleashed a “deluge of spending” to help bolster Re-
publican challengers who otherwise faced fundraising deficits and
long odds in their campaign.204 The credible (and often successful)
challenges these candidates were able to mount against relatively en-
sconced Democratic incumbents represented “arguably the most
clear-cut examples of the impact that these Republican-oriented
outside groups had on the midterm elections, spending record sums
on dozens of races” in the wake of Citizens United.205 In other words,
the Twentieth District “political battle was waged via third-party
outside interest groups.”206 Vidak was simply “in the right place at the
right time” to ride the wave and very nearly rode it to Washington.207
VII. Looking to 2012 & Beyond
The 2012 campaign will make the 2010 campaign look like the
calm before the campaign finance storm. Supporters of individual
candidates and both parties are poised to rely heavily on 501(c)(4)s
and other organizations which the Citizens United Court empowered,
raising the stakes and the need for a workable mutually acceptable
disclosure regime.
A. The Battle Lines
The Crossroads groups’ 2010 spending in these two California
districts specifically, and across the entire country, was likely just a pre-
view of super PAC and 501(c) activity to come, especially given a frac-
tious Republican presidential nominating contest and the likelihood
of a hotly contested presidential race in the 2012 general election.
Motivated by the perceived success of conservative-affiliated groups in
2010, a variety of both Republican and Democratic groups have mobil-
ized for the “blockbuster” election ahead. Indeed, by all accounts, the
2012 elections will be “awash in cash from undisclosed corporate and
labor sources with huge stakes in Washington policy making”—and,
given intensely partisan disagreement about the necessity of campaign
203. Ellis, supra note 178.
204. Michael Luo & Griff Palmer, Outside Groups on the Right Flexed Muscles in House
Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at P6.
205. Id.
206. Ellis, supra note 178.
207. Id.
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finance reform, we have little expectation legislation will rein in that
spending.208
The Crossroads groups are well positioned to maintain their in-
fluence moving forward and may emerge as the “possibly largest force
in the 2012 campaign, aside from the presidential candidates them-
selves and the political parties.”209 Steven Law and Karl Rove have ex-
plained that the two Crossroads groups were designed to “remain in
place beyond November [2010],” and voter lists and other assets the
organizations began developing in 2010 will be a valuable resource in
2012.210 In March 2011, the groups announced a combined fundrais-
ing target of $120 million for the 2012 election—a feasible target, Law
concluded, after checking in with his 2010 contributors, many of
whom reportedly planned “to come in at a significantly higher
level.”211 In September 2011, bolstered by greater-than-anticipated
fundraising, the groups doubled that fundraising target to $240 mil-
lion and announced that Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour would
assist their efforts.212 Crossroads GPS made smaller (but still substan-
tial) expenditures in early 2011 on targeted advertisements attacking
incumbent Democrats—including Jim Costa.213 By late 2011, Cross-
roads GPS had committed upwards of one million dollars in competi-
tive races, including the Massachusetts, Nebraska, Montana, and
Missouri Senate races.214 American Crossroads also remains active,
having spent $690,000 in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to elect Re-
publican Jane Corwin in a May 2011 congressional special election in
upstate New York.215 Three months later, the group spent $255,360 to
support Republican Mark Amodei’s successful campaign for an open
congressional seat in Nevada.216 The Crossroads groups have also sig-
naled their continued commitment to coordinating fundraising and
expenditures with other conservative-oriented groups.
208. See Rutenberg, supra note 139.
209. Mullins, supra note 18.
210. Crowley, supra note 36, at 35; Rutenberg, supra note 92.
211. Mullins, supra note 18.
212. Jonathan D. Salant, Rove’s Crossroads Doubles Fundraising Goal, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 9,
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-09/rove-s-crossroads-seeks-to-raise-
more-than-240-million-for-2012-elections.html.
213. Steve Peoples, Crossroads GPS Launches $450,000 Radio Ad Buy, ROLL CALL, Feb. 23,
2011.
214. Joshua Miller, Crossroads GPS Buys Ads in Montana, Missouri, Massachusetts and Ne-
braska, ROLL CALL, Dec. 8, 2011.
215. Carl Hulse, Surprise Victory in New York Invigorates Democrats Looking to 2012, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2011, at A12.
216. Salant, supra note 212.
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After largely watching from the sidelines during 2010 and exper-
iencing the detrimental effect of their passivity, Democrats have be-
gun to organize. As one commenter succinctly put it, the “Democrats
simply could not allow Republicans to have exclusive possession of
these fundraising groups.”217 In early 2011, several Democratic activ-
ists launched the “Priorities USA Action” group, registered as a 527,
and “Priorities USA,” its 501(c)(4) sister organization, with a goal of
supporting President Obama’s reelection.218 Press reports state that
the Priorities organizations intend to coordinate their efforts with
other like-minded groups, including the House Majority PAC and Ma-
jority PAC groups (which will concentrate on House and Senate races,
respectively).219 A fourth group, American Bridge 21st Century, will
reportedly conduct targeted research on key races and candidates.220
Late 2011 and 2012 also saw substantial super PAC activity in an
intra-party contest, as organizations nominally affiliated with the ma-
jor Republican presidential candidates poured money into that frac-
tured race. By early 2012, with just the Iowa caucuses and New
Hampshire primary decided, super PACs supporting the major candi-
dates had already spent over $19 million in the nomination race.221 In
the lead-up to the South Carolina primary, the third nomination
event on the calendar, super PAC spending on that contest accounted
for 60% of all broadcast advertising spending in that state—the first
time in the 2012 Republican nomination race that super PAC spend-
ing exceeded candidate spending on broadcast television.222 Indeed,
the breadth of super PAC spending was so substantial that it emerged
as a topic of discussion at a South Carolina debate.223
This burst of organizing on both the left and the right, and rush
to organize by supporters of individual candidates, reflects a rare con-
sensus that substantial changes to current campaign finance rules are
unlikely in the short term. Democrats and Republicans remain in-
tensely divided on what reforms are needed to those rules, and little




221. See Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.), http://www.open-
secrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php?ql3 (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
222. Greg Giroux, Super-PACs Dominate Airwaves with Flood of Negative Commercials,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-18/super-
pacs-dominate-airwaves-with-flood-of-negative-commercials.html.
223. Michael Beckel, Super PACs a Hot Topic in GOP Debate, OPENSECRETS BLOG (Jan. 17,
2012, 3:13 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/01/super-pacs-a-hot-topic-in-
gop-debat.html.
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progress has been made to close that gap.224 A divided Congress
means meaningful legislation has little potential to pass. Against that
backdrop, even groups that disfavor the post-Citizens United regime
may feel compelled to “play ball” or risk falling further behind in a
campaign finance arms race.225 Perhaps ironically, these groups’ ac-
quiescence to the status quo may serve to increase their resistance to
future structural changes.226 In sum, near-term restrictions on who
may fund political speech appear unlikely—particularly where the Su-
preme Court has now thrown the viability of many such proposals into
doubt as a matter of constitutional law.
B. Other Proposals
Citizens United has prompted a litany of “reform” proposals to ad-
dress various aspects of the Court’s decision within the confines of the
First Amendment rights of political speakers. Many of these proposals
have been geared toward making it more difficult, or at least more
complicated, for certain corporations to fund IEs and ECs.227 Others
have focused, as we have, on increasing disclosure of the money given
and spent for IEs and ECs.
The best known and most comprehensive proposed reforms were
set forth in the DISCLOSE Act (“Democracy Is Strengthened by Cast-
ing Light On Spending in Elections”), which passed the House but
failed to achieve cloture by one vote the Senate in 2010.228 Among
224. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 95 (describing sharply different partisan reactions to
the DISCLOSE Act).
225. See Mullins, supra note 18.
226. See Rutenberg, supra note 139.
227. See L. PAIGE WHITAKER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41096, LEGISLATIVE OP-
TIONS AFTER Citizens United v. FEC: Constitutional and Legal Issues (2010) (discussing, in
addition to disclosure of donors to § 501(c) organizations, proposals concerning increased
disclaimer requirements, shareholder notification and approval, restrictions on foreign-
owned corporations, conditioning government contracts or grants on forgoing right to
political speech, taxation of corporate campaign-related expenditures, and public financ-
ing for congressional campaigns).
228. Bill Summary & Status—111th Congress (2009–2010)—H.R. 5175, THOMAS, http:/
/thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR05175:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Nov.
12, 2011) (passed 219-206 on June 24, 2010); Bill Summary & Status—111th Congress
(2009–2010)—S. 3628, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN036
28:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (cloture not invoked by 59-39 party line
vote). H.R. 5175 passed with support from just two Republicans, one of whom (Rep. Joseph
Cao) represented a heavily Democratic district and was defeated in the 2010 general elec-
tion, and the other of whom (Rep. Michael Castle) did not run for reelection to the
House. 156 Cong. Rec. H4828 (daily ed. June 24, 2010) (Roll No. 391), http://clerk.house.
gov/evs/2010/roll391.xml; Statewide Election Results, LA. SEC’Y STATE (Nov. 2, 2010), http://
staticresults.sos.la.gov/11022010/11022010_Congressional.html; see Election Results, STATE
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numerous other provisions, DISCLOSE sought to dramatically expand
the disclosure of contributions related to IEs and ECs by requiring any
organization that makes IEs or ECs (or transfers funds to another per-
son for the purpose of making an IE or EC) in excess of $10,000,229
including 501(c)(4)s, report certain donors depending upon the type
of expenditure and from which account the money for the expendi-
ture originated:
Table 4: DISCLOSE Act Provisions Governing Disclosure of
Contributors to IEs and ECs230
Unrestricted Unrestricted
Donor Payment— Donor Payment—
Contribution for IEs not paid for IEs paid for out
Type of Campaign-Related out of segregated of segregated
Expenditure Purpose account account
Independent $600 $600 $6,000Expenditures
Electioneering $1,000 $1,000 $10,000Communications
In addition, the top funder (i.e., the CEO or highest ranking offi-
cial of an organization) of a political ad would be required to appear
on camera and say that he or she “approves this message.”231
Given the defeat of DISCLOSE in 2010, when the Democrats con-
trolled Congress following a substantial 2008 victory, the legislation
DEL. (Sept. 14, 2010), http://elections.delaware.gov/archive/elect10/elect10_Primary/
html/election.shtml.
229. H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. § 211(a) (2010). The Act provided that a person shall be
deemed to have transferred funds for the purpose of making campaign-related expendi-
tures if there have been substantial discussions about such expenditures between the per-
son making the transfer and the person receiving the funds, if the person making the
transfer or the person receiving the transfer knows (or should have known) of the intent to
make campaign-related expenditures by the person making the transfer, or if the person
making the transfer or the person receiving the funds made a campaign-related expendi-
ture in the last election cycle or the current cycle. Id. DISCLOSE contained an exception
for 501(c)(4)s with (c)(4) status for ten years, a total of at least 500,000 dues paying mem-
bers in every state, and funded by no more than 15% of corporate and labor funds, none
of which is used for campaign-related activity. H.R. 5175, § 211(c).
230. H.R. 5175, §§ 211(a), 212(b)(1)(B). All amounts are aggregate, equal to or
exceeding. Id. The original Senate version of the Act, S. 3295, provided for the same
threshold for contributions to organizations making IEs as well as those making ECs, i.e.,
$1000 and $10,000. S. 3295, 111th Cong. § 211(a) (2010). An organization can also
establish a separate “Campaign-Related Activity” account to receive and disburse political
expenditures, which would require disclosure only of donors to that account. H.R. 5175,
§ 213.
231. H.R. 5175, § 214(b).
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has not been seriously revived under a Republican-controlled House
and a pared-back Democratic majority in the Senate. Accordingly, re-
formers and their allies have turned to options requiring no congres-
sional approval. In April 2011, President Obama began circulating a
draft executive order that would require companies seeking govern-
ment contracts to disclose their contributions to fund IEs and ECs.232
Although the President acting alone can chip away at the wall of se-
crecy around contributions to 501(c)(4)s to fund IEs and ECs, only
more comprehensive legislation can give full effect to the important
interests that disclosure serves.
C. Our Proposal
Mindful both of the political realities hindering significant struc-
tural changes as well as the public interest in greater disclosure, we
propose the following disclosure regime concerning any IE or EC ex-
penditures, whether by 501(c)(4)s or other organizations:
• Disclosure of all contributors who make contributions aggregat-
ing $100,000 to the person making a disbursement for an IE or
EC by the end of the day following the disbursement.
• These obligations would not begin until the first day of the next
odd-numbered year after enactment of the proposal.
Accordingly, our proposal balances: (1) the need for greater
transparency of those attempting to have a major impact on American
elections; (2) the organizational burden and potential disincentive for
participation imposed by disclosure; and (3) the interests of contribu-
tors that have already contributed to these organizations under the
present disclosure regime.
Critically, our proposed monetary threshold for disclosure—
$100,000 in the aggregate—is substantially higher than either any cur-
rent campaign finance disclosure regime or other reform proposals.
This threshold is intended so that those people or organizations that
have a substantial stake and likely have a role in the IE or EC are
disclosed, while less generous donors without such a stake or role re-
main anonymous. That fewer, larger contributors must be disclosed
will also mitigate any administrative burden on the part of the organi-
zation making the IE or EC.
232. Draft Exec. Order, Disclosure of Political Spending by Government Contractors (Apr. 13,
2011), available at http://www.politico.com/static/PPM187_disclosure.html; Kenneth P.
Vogel, Obama Administration Considers Moves to Limit Anonymous Donations, POLITICO (Apr.
19, 2011, 8:46 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/53445.html.
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Effective broadcast advertising campaigns, with rare exception,
are expensive. Congressional campaigns often spend many hundreds
of thousands of dollars on advertising, which is typically their largest
expense, and senatorial and presidential campaigns will spend mil-
lions.233 Section 501(c)(4) organizations making high-impact IEs and
ECs, like Crossroads GPS, are likely to spend similar amounts.234 It is
unreasonable to think that a donor who gives $1000 to a 501(c)(4) for
ECs (or without a designation as to use) will have any influence on the
content of the EC or the manner in which it is shown. Only donors
whose contribution is sufficient to fund a substantial portion of an EC,
or a 501(c)(4)’s EC program, are likely to have any strategic input. In
addition, only substantial donors are likely to come to the attention of
the affected candidate and potentially influence his or her actions in
office.
We are mindful that this proposal would create a substantial dif-
ferential between the threshold for disclosure for contributions fur-
thering IEs and ECs as compared with contributions directly to
candidates that must be disclosed if they exceed $200.235 While we
disagree with the Citizens United Court’s conclusion that IEs can never
“give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption,”236 the
threshold at which a contribution can corrupt is surely much higher
in the context of an IE or EC than a direct contribution to a
candidate.237
In addition, the disclosure of contributions without requiring a
link to an IE or EC closes the FEC-created loophole permitting the
contributor to evade disclosure simply by not telling the person mak-
233. See, e.g., Expenditures Breakdown: Barack Obama, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPON-
SIVE POL.), http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/expend.php?cycle=2008&cid=N00009638
(last visited May 30, 2011) (noting that the Obama campaign spent over $400 million on
media and media-related expenses in 2008, accounting for well over half of its total ex-
penditures); Jim Costa: Campaign Finance/Money Expenditures 2010, OPENSECRETS.ORG
(CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.), http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/expend.php?cycle=
2010&cid=N00026341&type=I (last visited May 30, 2011) (noting that Costa campaign
spent $1.4 million on media in 2010); Dan Lungren: Campaign Finance/Money Expenditures
2010, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.), http://www.opensecrets.org/politi-
cians/expend.php?cycle=2010&cid=N00011971&type=I (last visited May 30, 2011) (noting
that Lungren campaign spent almost $1 million on media in 2010).
234. See supra Part VI.B. (discussing Crossroads GPS’ anti-Costa ads).
235. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.8(a) (2011).
236. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010).
237. We do not believe that, given the current costs of running for federal office, that a
contribution of $200 could possibly corrupt a candidate or elected official. Whether the
disclosure threshold for contributions to candidates should be raised, however, is beyond
the scope of this Article.
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ing an IE or EC that the contribution is specifically for the purpose of
that particular IE or EC, even if circumstances make that particular
use of the contribution certain. Tracking the money utilized for an IE
or EC is therefore essential. Although we do not believe that the regu-
lations should require it, organizations may wish to ease any addi-
tional administrative burden by creating a separate segregated fund
for IEs and ECs so that it need not parse out which heretofore com-
mingled funds were utilized for IEs and ECs.
Finally, we suggest that our proposal become effective the first
day of the next odd numbered year following the next general elec-
tion. While the delay may have the added benefit of increasing the
proposal’s political viability, there are good substantive reasons not to
change the rules of the game during the heat of the 2012 campaign.
As an initial matter, many contributors have already donated to
501(c)(4) organizations in anticipation of the 2012 election likely did
so with the understanding that their identity would not be disclosed.
At least certain (if not many) of them may have chosen to give be-
cause of their ability to remain anonymous. Moreover, we presume
some 501(c)(4)s have been newly formed and/or operated in a partic-
ular manner in reliance on the current disclosure scheme. While we
believe that a regime under which donors are disclosed is vastly pref-
erable, we acknowledge changing the rules during an election cycle
can be damaging not only to those directly impacted but also to the
process as a whole.
Conclusion
Having seen their potential in the Republican wave of 2010, a
legion of 501(c)(4)s and other tax-exempt organizations on both
sides of the political aisle are mobilizing to make an impact in the
2012 elections. Even if a small fraction of the trillions of dollars of
corporate money that can now be spent for IEs and ECs is utilized for
that purpose, it will have a major and growing impact in 2012 and
beyond. Typically dozens of congressional races—and even the presi-
dency itself—are decided by margins narrow enough to be closed by a
well-financed, targeted EC campaign.238 Without question, there is a
tremendous amount at stake.
238. See House Big Board: Election Results 2010, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.
com/2010/results/house/big-board (last visited May 30, 2011); Senate Big Board: Election
Results 2010, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/results/senate/big-board
(last visited May 30, 2011). In 2010, 46 House races and seven Senate races were decided by
a five point or smaller margin. House Big Board, supra; Senate Big Board, supra. In addition,
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The shift in the locus of electoral influence toward these outside
groups has ignited a battle over disclosing their donors in Congress, at
the FEC, and among the interested public. That the prudence, not to
mention the constitutionality, of disclosure is debated so vigorously
after years of relative consensus shows how important contributions to
these groups have become to American elections.
Further, in part because conservative groups have thus far taken
greatest advantage of Citizens United, the battle to expand disclosure to
encompass contributions to these outside groups has become—like so
many others in politics today—vehemently partisan. Many Republi-
cans see the drive for disclosure as a liberal attempt to suppress
through retaliation, the otherwise-anonymous corporate contribu-
tions on which they will likely increasingly rely. In turn, many Demo-
crats see opposition to disclosure as evidence of the singular fidelity of
American conservatism to big business and salivate over the prospect
of running advertisements tying Republican candidates to their puta-
tive corporate masters.
We understand that this partisan chasm makes it difficult to
change the status quo so that certain contributors to 501(c)(4)s that
make IEs or ECs are disclosed. We believe, however, that the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on disclosure has it right. The gatekeeper of
our democracy, an informed electorate, demands disclosure of those
contributors that are having a substantial impact on our elections. For
example, in a race like the Costa-Vidak race, in which spending by
Crossroads GPS and other 501(c)(4)s amounted to a large percentage
of the amount spent by the campaigns and parties, it is nonsensical
that a $201 contributor to Vidak was disclosed and a hypothetical
multi-million dollar contributor to Crossroads GPS was not.
This Article proffers a new reform proposal, combining policy-
minded principles and politically-minded pragmatism. Informing the
electorate about large contributors to organizations running IEs and
ECs, while permitting smaller contributors to remain anonymous, and
delaying enactment so as not to disrupt the present election cycle may
not provide comprehensive campaign finance reform. Nonetheless, it
is a critical step toward a fully informed electorate and, in turn, a
more vibrant democracy.
President Obama would have lost in 2008 if only about 500,000 of his voters in seven states
(Colorado, Florida, Indiana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, and Virginia) had
voted for John McCain instead. FEC, OFFICIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS FOR UNITED
STATES PRESIDENT (2008), available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/2008pres.pdf
(last visited May 30, 2011).
